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Title: 1815 The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras by Peter Hofschroer ISBN: 1-85367-304-8 Publisher: Greenhill Books Pub. Date: 01 February, 1998 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $49.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 3.79 (24 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: A Refreshing viewpoint
Comment: This book along with the second volume " The German Victory" seems to have touched a nerve ending among many readers.
The book covers the overall situation in Europe before Waterloo, the fragile coalition between the Allies, the fighting around Carleroi, Franses and of course the dual batlles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. Peter Hofschroer writes almost entirely from a Prussian perspective which is refreshing but at times a little frustrating (as I would have liked a bit more French input). He tries to convince the reader that the Waterloo Campaign was more of a German/Prussian victory than a British one based on the make up and numbers of the Allied forces that actually fought in the campaign. He also pulls no punches on the Duke of Wellington's performance in the opening rounds of the campaign and concludes from the evidence of his research that the Duke deceived his Prussian Allies into fighting at Ligny when he knew he could not offer any support.
I enjoyed reading this book which I found to be thoroughly researched and thought provoking and also made good use of maps. Peter Hofschroer has certainly come up with an interesting alternative view point which may polarize the way many people view how the Waterloo Campaign was won.
Rating: 3
Summary: Lots of useful information; unconvincing analysis
Comment: I suppose any new book on the Waterloo campaign needs an angle. For Hamilton-Williams, of course, it was the (now discredited) accusation against the Sibornes of a "crime against history". For Hofschroer it is the perceived slighting of the German (Prussian, really) contribution in the campaign by English-speaking authors, and of course various charges against the Duke of Wellington, primarily that that he intentionally misled the Prussians regarding his ability to support them at Ligny; that this contributed to their defeat there; and that he and his admirers subsequently tried to cover this deceit by doctoring the official record. I am all for correcting misconceptions, and I hardly see the Duke as "an infallible, totally virtuous near-deity", but I just didn't find these claims that compelling.
Hofschroer's strategy is basically to interpret every ambiguous piece of evidence in such a way that it supports his case against the Duke. Thus the book reads like a courtroom transcript with the case for the defense deleted. To take one example, consider Hofschroer's treatment of the allied wrangling over how the various minor German contingents would be divided between Wellington and Bluecher. The Prussians try to claim all of these troops for themselves (except the Hanoverians, who have long been part of the British army and are never at issue), but in the end they are outmaneuvered by the wily Wellington with the result that the minor Germans are split roughly 50-50. Hofschroer inflates this to a 2-1 edge for the Brits by including the Hanoverians in the final calculation, and then portrays Wellington's motive in fighting for these German troops at all as merely an effort to gain some future (postwar) advantage. Of course, any decent defense lawyer would note the disingenuousness of the arithmetic, and point out that while postwar advantage may indeed have been a secondary consideration, Wellington's primary concern was most likely simply to field a viable army. Indeed, before this was resolved he was so short of troops that he actually considered importing Portuguese. Hofschroer mentions this, and later notes in passing that Wellington's army would have been painfully small without the Germans, but he doesn't state the obvious conclusion: that the Duke actually needed these troops. Instead, this is just the first in a series of tricks and swindles perpetrated by Wellington on the simple, trusting Prussians. Perfidious Albion!
Overall the one-sidedness of the discussion and the author's wounded tone did a lot to spoil this book for me. It's a shame, too, because it does contains a lot of very useful information on the various German armies and contingents, much of which was not previously available in English. I can recommend this book as a very valuable resource on these grounds.
Rating: 3
Summary: A nice change but to one sided to be an all rounder
Comment: This book is strong in its detailing of Prussian action, strong in investigating any mistakes that the British may have made but like most axe-grinders weak in describing anything that upsets his theory.
I can name countless examples of minor 'attitude' mistakes which include such delights as Prussia mistaken for Germany ( it is not a foregone conclusion that a greater Germany would form at this point and a lot of the Germans appear to hate Prussia anyhow but of course if the forces were split by country then the author would not be able to produce his tabloid headline to sell his book tsk tsk )
A complete refusal to view Prussian attitudes for what they were - example Prussia starts mobilising for war AGAINST Britain,Autstria and France ( because Britain still invlolved against america) 2 days AFTER these 3 make a secret defensive alliance and the author states how horrified Prussia was at this terrible action????? bizarre attitude.
French aggression is frequently mentioned yet Napoleon only actually started 2 wars ( however many he 'helped' ) and Prussian eagerness to avenge the 'Sufferings' on their nation are even more frequently mentioned yet its fairly clear that revenge for the embarrasment of losing was more of a motivating factor.
The most obvious and regretable part of the book lies in his ignoring of any evidence that counters his claim. A major example lies in his statement that Bourmonts defection made no difference to the campaign as the Prussians knew all Napoleons plans anyway. No mention is made of the fact ( bar a sentance later commenting on Gerards late arrival ) that he commanded the advance division of Gerards corps and his disappearance delayed Gerard almost half a day and that had this defection not occured the early engagement at Gilly would have been lost and Ligny would have started earlier and hence the campaign would probably have been lost. I know Historians should avoid what ifs but this statement is obviously ignored because it removes glory from the magnificent Prussian rear guard action.
On a positive note his description of the battles themselves are superb and well written and his destruction of Wellingtons attempts to cover his early mistakes in the campaign that caused the Prussian defeat are well documented and eye-opening ( Wellington shows himself to be almost a good a propagandist as Napoleon ) it is just a shame that his lack of accuracy whenever anything might tarnish the glory of Prussian arms and to quote his own book (replace de Ros with the author ;) )"if de Ros's account is inaccurate regarding this final comment, can it be trusted at all"
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Title: 1815, The Waterloo Campaign: The German Victory : From Waterloo to the Fall of Napoleon by Peter Hofschroer ISBN: 1853673684 Publisher: Greenhill Books Pub. Date: 01 October, 1999 List Price(USD): $49.95 |
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Title: Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon by Rory Muir ISBN: 0300082703 Publisher: Yale University Press Pub. Date: 01 April, 2000 List Price(USD): $19.95 |
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Title: The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle by Mark Adkin ISBN: 0811718549 Publisher: Stackpole Books Pub. Date: 01 January, 2002 List Price(USD): $59.95 |
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Title: Napoleons Grande Armee of 1813 by Scotty Bowden, Scott Bowden ISBN: 0962665517 Publisher: Combined Publishing Pub. Date: 01 July, 1990 List Price(USD): $34.95 |
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Title: 1812: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia by Paul Britten Austin ISBN: 185367415X Publisher: Greenhill Books Pub. Date: 01 August, 2000 List Price(USD): $39.95 |
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