Order from a Major Online Bookstore
Ultimate Book Price Comparison Engine
Save Your Time And Money
| AnyBook4Less.com | Order from a Major Online Bookstore |
|
| Home | Store List | FAQ | Contact Us | | ||
| Ultimate Book Price Comparison Engine Save Your Time And Money |
||
 |
Title: Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings by Danielj. Hughes, Daniel J. Hughes, Harry Bell ISBN: 0-89141-575-0 Publisher: Presidio Press Pub. Date: 01 December, 1995 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $19.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.75 (4 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: Good But Needs Maps
Comment: This is an excellent review of Moltke's work. It's clear and lucid and strikes upon those areas where Moltke's thinking influenced later strategic minds. It's one weakness is its lack of period maps. The book has a strategic section followed by Moltke's field account of some actual action that serves as an example of the theory just discussed. But unless you are familiar with the detail of 19th century geography for Austria, Prussia, France, and Denmark then much of the description is far from helpful. You'll get far more out of this book if you have already read "Koniggratz" by Craig and a history of the Franco-Prussian War.
Rating: 5
Summary: Strategy and Tactics
Comment: Prussia gained ascendancy over Austria and thus dominion of Germany through the art of war by one of its ablest commanders, Moltke the Elder. With Austria defeated at the decisive battle of Koniggratz (1866), Prussia stood alone for the coveted leadership of Germany; therefore, when France declared war on Prussia (1870) to prevent German unification, ironically this afforded Prussia the opportunity to fulfill its destiny. Napoleon III intended to cut Prussia off from the southern German republics; however, Prussia called the other German republics to arms, not for defense, but for a joint attack against the French vanguard, in French territory. The French seriously underestimated Prussia's capacity to rapidly deploy its seemingly disparate forces into one cohesive whole. How did Prussia accomplish this epic task? At the strategic level Prussia was able to marshal all of its forces under one central command, but at the tactical level the subordinate commanders were permitted the greatest independence possible to take the initiative (Selbstatigkeit).
Moltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.
According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.
Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and 'central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that 'interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III intended to implement a similar maneuver to cut Prussia off from south Germany. First, he hoped to defeat Prussia, alone, which would entice Austria and Italy into forming a triumvirate with him. Then he hoped the triumvirate would attack the south German Confederation.
During the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia was victorious in battle, but as Moltke says, 'at what a cost'. It seems to me that Prussia's losses were rather high, primarily because of their reluctance to change plans and to break off any engagement once it began. Then the 'peoples army' arose like a phoenix in the midst of the vanquished French field armies, which made the consummation of Moltke's final victory elusive. He could not pursue all the remaining military targets; therefore, he just focused on one-Paris. He surrounded the French capital with the preponderance of his remaining forces (150,000) because it was the only strategic option left open to him.
The commander should position himself with his uncommitted reserves to ensure that they are committed where and when they may be of greatest service; he should not be at the front with units already committed. He should send reserves to those areas where the forward units are already nearly winning, thereby, overcoming these areas of resistance faster, with fewer losses by their timely intervention. Secondly, he should endeavor to bolster tenuous positions or those that are in danger of being lost.
The attack has the advantage of dictating the course of events to the defender who must conform to them. The advantages are greater morale and confidence gained through the knowledge of the time and place of the attack. The best method of attack is to envelope the opponent with two forces. First, one must attack the opponent frontally with one force to pin down as much of their main force as possible. Then the second force must attack the opponent's flank. Moltke believed that both the frontal and flank attacks should be performed simultaneously, however, if I were attacking the flank, I would wait until it has been sufficiently denuded, since the opponent will be drawing forces from it to counter the frontal attack (i.e., feint). The flank attack is usually the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt), but the frontal attack may be the center of gravity as well. There should be a reserve element to cover the force attacking the opponent's flank. An example of precisely this method took place during the battle of Koniginhof (Austria, 1866).
This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. Many of these methods are just as valid today as they were in 1860. Moltke writes very lucidly with great candor, which is precisely what one would expect of a Prussian Officer.
Rating: 5
Summary: Moltke vs Clausewitz
Comment: Count Helmut von Moltke was perhaps the greatest military leader during the period between Napoleon and the First World War. Moltke shaped the way that the German Army looked at war up until 1945. What was important to Moltke was not a set of rules or principles, but rather a way of thinking. Initiative and control were stressed, "when in doubt advance toward the sound of the guns". . . While he had great respect for the Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whom he had limited contact with as a young staff officer, Moltke rejected several of Clausewitz's most important concepts, perhaps the most eventful being the place of the military in strategic decisions made during time of war. For Moltke the military should simply be allowed to fight the war to the finish at which time the political leadership would be allowed to negotiate the peace. Clausewitz saw war as the continuation of politics by other means, meaning that political decisions did not end with the commencement of hostilities but continued. The editor of this book mentions several similarities including one that upon closer study is in reality another break between the two outlooks. Referring to Book 6, Chapter 8 of On War, he mentions that Clausewitz wrote, "that all strategic planning rested on tactical success alone, because only tactical successes could produce a favorable outcome." Moltke obviously agreed since he thought, "strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory." However if one actually reads that chapter in On War one comes away with a different impression since Clausewitz's view is far more nuanced than that of Moltke. Clausewitz had experienced terrible defeat and great hardship during the struggle against Napoleon, having served with the Russians during the fateful campaign of 1812. It was the experience of that campaign which showed Clausewitz the importance of a Fabian strategy (denying battle, allowing an enemy to exhaust himself through exertion). Thus Clausewitz writes, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather that the tactical decision should be considered the operative principle. . . That is why we think it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and that -whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not - this is in all cases the fundamental basis for the decision."
Moltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial envelopment. This worked well in 1866 against the Austrians and in 1870 against the French. His system seemed to promise victory in any war. He had taken the gift of fire from Prometheus and changed its very nature, or so his followers thought. Moltke himself grew more cautious in his later years, suggesting that only a partial success could be achieved in a war against both France and Russia, a political solution would have to be found for the strategic dilemma instead. During the period up to and following the First World War, most German military thinkers followed Moltke's earlier views while giving lip service to Clausewitz. Moltke was the more modern man, the technician of war for the machine age, while Clausewitz was a philosopher, belonging to another time and mode of thinking, or so it seemed.
Professor Hughes' book provides translations of various examples of Moltke's writings. I found Moltke's views on the training and duties of General Staff officers particularly interesting. The editor includes excellent commentary on various German military terms and the ways that they have been translated into English in the past, some rather confusing.
In all I find this book well worth the money and would recommend it to those interested in German military history, 19th Century military history, and military strategy and tactics in general, particularly the evolution of military thought. What seems to be missing is an edition of the works of Sigismund von Schlichting, who as Hughes points out provides the key link between Moltke's theories and modern theory.
 |
Title: Frederick the Great on the Art of War by Frederick, Jay Luvaas ISBN: 0306809087 Publisher: Da Capo Press Pub. Date: 01 April, 1999 List Price(USD): $17.50 |
 |
Title: The Art of War by Antoine Henri Jomini, Charles Messenger, Antoine Henri De Jomini ISBN: 1853672491 Publisher: Greenhill Books Pub. Date: 01 September, 1996 List Price(USD): $19.95 |
 |
Title: On War (Classics S.) by Karl Von Clausewitz ISBN: 0140444270 Publisher: Penguin Books Pub. Date: 01 June, 1982 List Price(USD): $12.95 |
 |
Title: Strategy by Basil Henry Liddell Hart ISBN: 0452010713 Publisher: Plume Books Pub. Date: 01 April, 1991 List Price(USD): $17.00 |
 |
Title: Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 (European History in Perspective) by Arden Bucholz ISBN: 0333687582 Publisher: Palgrave MacMillan Pub. Date: 01 May, 2001 List Price(USD): $24.95 |
Thank you for visiting www.AnyBook4Less.com and enjoy your savings!
Copyright� 2001-2021 Send your comments
