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Title: Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Consumer One-Off) by John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt ISBN: 0-8330-3030-2 Publisher: RAND Corporation Pub. Date: 01 November, 2001 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.25 (4 reviews)
Rating: 3
Summary: An interesting pot pourri of articles on an important topic
Comment: There is a wide variance between the 11 contributing authors.
Some of them give stimulating eye witness accounts of events in Seattle, or detailed case studies of criminal activities from around the globe.
Then we get others who just give you their opinion on an issue, expressed so academically that with one of them I was desperately looking for any indication of form of who / what / where / when that might have contributed to the development of their ideas.
So for those who cited the evidence - 4 or even 5 stars - but for those who gave rather sterile theoretical opinions - 2 stars.
And what a shame there was no Index.
Rating: 5
Summary: Excellent network theory
Comment: This is the best 'network theory' book I've read. The book is a collection, and the 'field work' is more enthusiastic than thought provoking. Binding together the fieldwork, at front and back, is the analysis of Arquilla and Ronfeldt. Though only 20% of the text, their comments make the reading exceptionally rewarding.
The deep dynamic guiding Arquilla and Ronfeldt's analysis is that the information revolution favors the rise of network forms of organization and thus redefines cooperation and conflict. According to their terminology, the really bad side is 'cyberwar', an earlier book. 'Netwar' is a more ambiguous form of network conflict, one that can be used by social activists for the benefit of all. While I find their scholarship excellent, I'm less than sanguine regarding our ability to distinguish enthusiasm from cohersion.
The term netwar calls attention to the prospect of network-based conflict becoming pervasive at all levels of social interaction. Just as romance is now streamlined by online match-makers, so too will the new technologies enhance and focus aggression, both the good and bad kind. According to the authors, 'Netwar' is a form of 'just warfare.' Most of the book covers examples of non-violent, democratic netwar-warriors.There is a brief review of traditional crime going online for drug distribution efficiencies, but most is devoted to friendly political activists ranging from Zapatistas to anti-globalists.
Fortunately, the authors forget their preoccupation with Zapatistas when trying to make sense of the field work. In particular, they focus on the remarkably vague notions we attach to the term 'networks'. It seems everyone knows what it means, but no one has the same concept in mind.
Wisely, the authors point out our need to define 'network organization' itself. To this end, they offer a very thoughtful survey of network organization theory. Avoiding easy answers, they list some provocative, but contradictory theories. The reader is left to piece together their own conclusions
They provide 3 perspectives: 1) 'actor and link,' 2) 'methodological' and 3) 'Naturalist'. In more familiar domains, there are the perspectives of the physicist, sociologist and botanist.
Probably most of the literature defines networks in terms of 'actors' (nodes) and 'links' (ties) whose relationships have a patterned structure. Using this scheme, one can draw a set of basic shapes for networks: chain or line networks, hub/star/wheel networks, all channel and hybrid networks.
An alternative 'actor' framework is the notion of 'friendship cliques' and 'interlocking memberships.' This suggests the notion of networks of networks. One 'actor' can belong to a variety of 'cliques', thus interlocking a variety of networks. One's personal power relates to their network assets, not personal attributes. In this case, the 'unit of analysis' is not the individual 'actor', but the network as a distinct identity. The network functions to create opportunities for both it's members and for it's 'network self. '
Another 'actor' framework stresses the importance of specific 'actor' roles. In this view, small group dynamics rely on a natural self-organization process that sorts out specific roles, and creates roles for outsiders to play. Here the focus is on the tight/loose connectedness of individuals to their network and the network to other networks. In this scheme, degrees of reciprocity characterize exchanges between parties (both individual and group). This 'flow' between actors is colored by the roles each accepts and the diversity is great. Equality is only one of many ways to order relationships.
An entirely different focus is upon measurement of 'network' units. One measure is the individual's recognition of the network as an entity. For example, network analysts might ask whether the actors recognize that they are participating in a particular network, and whether they are committed to operating as a network. 'Who do you work for?' represents the archetypical question/issue. An even deeper issue is the notion of 'self' and the ability of a 'network' to allow 'selfhood' to emerge. Though somewhat distant from mainstream terminology, almost everyone will understand the notion that organizations have a 'mind of their own' and that it implies the network has a 'selfhood' it will strive to protect.
Finally, the authors include the 'naturalist' view of Fukuyama that networks are nothing new, that networks are nothing more than 'trust' communities. Trust communities are nothing new. Along the same lines are 'small world' network theories, a body of thought that suggests networks and 'life' itself are inextricably woven together.
While the networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout a global social domain. Along these lines, they quote Keck and Sikkink's notion that networks are defined as "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange. This seems addressed at one of the most universally recognized phenomena of networks, resiliency to shock unless a key hub (if there is one) is taken down. This interest in survival is a key part of the naturalist perspective.
In what I find the most illuminating discussion, the authors encompass the wide diversity in network theory by suggesting a multi-level theory of organization to account for network dynamics and resilience. In their scheme, there are 5 levels;
1. organizational design.
2. the narrative story about the network's genesis and powers.
3. The doctrinal habits used for producing desired outcomes, initiating newcomers and developing seniority.
4. Technological tools
5. Personal ties of loyalty and trust.
Personally, I suspect networks, like the Internet, evolve without a plan. They emerge and persist in spite of their plans and desires of those that give them concrete reality. Thus, I somewhat disagree with the 'title' of level #1, if not the concept.
Their focus on level #2, the network's organizational story, is probably the most original and insightful. Though the authors seem hopeful that 'netwar' has a bright side, consider how the 'bright side' is entirely defined by the organizational narrative. How is the network's bright side described in a Wahabi madrasas? Behind the walls of the Vatican?
Rating: 4
Summary: Lacks Index But Excellent Collection
Comment:
Although their references lean toward "the usual suspects" among the beltway bubbas, and none of the authors demonstrate real access to the various hacker groups with deeper insights than any government bureaucrat will ever achieve, this is without question one of the best sets of articles, put together by two people I view as being the most capable in this area of inquiry, and therefore I recommend it very strongly as a starting point.
As with most publications by RAND it lacks an index, for which I deduct one star. The value of an index does not appear to be appreciated by those who publish these taxpayer-funded collections, and I continually lament the myopia that prevents the publishers from making such a useful collection even more valuable by taking the time to create an aggregate index.
I hope this is the last of the theoretical volumes. While it has some operationally-oriented contributions, one of the best being by Phil Williams on Transnational Criminal Networks, it is too theoretical overall, and much too US-centric. There are French, Nordic, and Singaporean, and Australian authorities, to mention just a few, that the editors must now make an effort to bring into a larger dialog. At the same time, it is now vital that we get on with much deeper study and discussion of the actual networks and specific practices--we must do much more in documenting the "order of battle" for netwar. One article, for example, lists a sample of Arabic web sites but goes no further--I would have liked to see some discussion of the 396 terrorist, insurgent, and opposition web sites, including the "Muslim Hackers" who asked for a clerical ruling on whether the Koran encouraged hacking as a means of war (it does, according to the same people that support bin Laden's views), and I would like to see much more integration with the investigative efforts of both law enforcement authorities and private sector security and fraud authorities. I am especially disappointed that all of these authorities appear to be largely oblivious to or at least not making substantive reference to the ten-year-long track record compiled by Winn Schartau and his InfoWarCon speakers and web site, an event that is arguably the only serious international venue for addressing these issues in a serious manner, with a commensurately valuable web site.
There is one other major gap in this book's approach to networks and netwars. With the exception of Paul de Armond's article on netwar against the World Trade Organization, there are no references to intelligence failures and intelligence requirements vis a vis this threat domain. The editors and authors need to establish intelligence concepts and doctrine for this threat.
This book represents the very best that DoD money can fund in isolation, and therein lies the problem. What few taxpayer funds are spent by DoD in addressing such important matters and not being spent wisely because there is no serious commitment to creating a data warehouse of all studies related to networks and netwar; there is no commitment to accessing and understanding the considerable lessons learned outside the somewhat nepotistic DoD network of standard experts; and there seems to be no commitment to creating a center of excellence that can nurture *public* understanding and new *public* standards for protecting both our critical infrastructure and the vital data that circulates on that infrastructure.
The editors and the authors are of the very highest caliber. They are also operating in a vacuum. I for one would like to see them get serious funding, to include the establishment of a public international center of excellence on netwar, with branch offices in London and Singapore.
We are losing the Third World War, between governments and gangs, in part because the military-industrial-congressional complex continues to define security in terms of very expensive mobility and weapons systems--communications, computing, and intelligence are an afterthought, and the authors are quite correct in the aggregate when they suggest that we are our own worst enemy in failing to redirect substantial funds toward cyber-war and cyber-peace. The editors and authors could be very helpful if they address in their next volume, both an intelligence order of battle against which capabilities might be created; and specific proposals for establishing international, national, and state & local capabilities. What should they be, what will it cost, who should manage them? "It ain't real until its the budget." The authors are gracious to a fault, but it is clear from their work in the aggregate that they share a concern with our lack of preparedness for a 9-11 level of effort against our financial, transportation, power, and communications networks. They merit the greatest of respect and a full hearing from the public.
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