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Title: Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics by James Porter Moreland, Scott B. Rae ISBN: 0-8308-1577-5 Publisher: Intervarsity Press Pub. Date: April, 2000 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.38 (8 reviews)
Rating: 2
Summary: One part qualified success, one part total failure.
Comment:
The aims of this book are: (1) to establish and defend Thomistic substance dualism as a viable view of what we are most fundamentally; and (2) to show that Thomistic substance dualism entails various (conservative) conclusions about medical technologies such as abortion, cloning, and euthanasia.
The first part of the book, written by Moreland, pursues the first aim, and is a qualified success. Moreland argues that Thomistic dualism best accounts for our intuitions concerning free agency, the unity of consciousness, personal identity, the conceivability of disembodied existence, and so on. Some of the issues here are indeed difficult for non-dualists. Of course, they are difficult issues for dualists as well; and the inference (which Moreland at times seems to make) from "this is a difficult problem for materialists" to "therefore dualism is the right answer" is not only plainly invalid, but is all the more shaky when the postulated solution is a doctrine as obscure as Thomistic dualism. Moreland also fails to explain how an immaterial substance, the soul, can bring about extensive physical effects (as he claims it can--for example, during embryological development); and he fails to explain how Thomistic dualism can predict or account for the extensive and striking correlations between mental states and brain states (Moreland simply *asserts* that these correlations are to be expected on Thomistic dualism, without explaining *why* they are to be expected). Consequently, Thomistic dualism ends up looking very much less attractive than, say, William Hasker's "emergent dualism", on which mind-world interaction and mind-brain correlations are a lot less mysterious (because the mind, on Hasker's view, emerges from the states and operations of the brain). Still, if only because the issues here are difficult and because all the postulated solutions to the mind-body problem appear to have reasonable objections to them, this first part of the book is at least not a total failure.
The same cannot be said, however, for the second part, written by Rae and pursuing the second aim mentioned above. Taking the first part of the book to have established that zygotes, embryos and foetuses are "persons" from conception onwards (where "person", following Boethius, was defined in the first part of the book to be "an individual substance with a rational nature"), Rae argues that important conclusions follow for medical ethics. For example, Judith Thomson aside, the pro-choice position on abortion is generally defended by appeal to the claim that zygotes, embryos and foetuses are not "persons". Since it was established in the first part of the book, Rae says, that zygotes, embryos and foetuses *are* "persons", therefore the pro-choice position is undermined and abortion is morally wrong. Similarly for cloning, euthanasia, and so on.
Nice try, but it's a fallacy of equivocation. What the first part of the book argued was that foetuses are "persons" in the sense there defined, namely, "individual substances with a rational nature". In sharp contrast, what is at stake in debates over abortion and the like is whether foetuses are "persons" in quite a separate sense, namely, "individuals *with a right to life*". To argue, as Rae does, that foetuses are "persons" in the first sense and must therefore have a right to life is to equivocate between these two senses of the term "person". Put another way, from the (alleged) fact that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of being individual substances with a rational nature, it *simply does not follow* that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of having a right to life. This equivocation fallacy--I kid you not--pervades Rae's discussion of *every single issue* in the second part of the book, and renders practically all his conclusions unsupported. The second part of the book is therefore a total failure: it fails to show that any *mildly interesting* ethical conclusions, let alone any *important* ones, can be derived from Thomistic substance dualism. Of course, those who suspect you cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" might have predicted this failure from the outset; for what are Moreland and Rae trying to do, if not to derive conclusions about what we "ought" to do (e.g., not kill foetuses) from a theory about what each of us "is" (i.e., an immaterial soul)?
So then: one part qualified success, one part total failure. Result: a rather generous two stars.
Rating: 5
Summary: Arguments for dualism
Comment: In "Body & Soul," authors J P Moreland and Scott Rae present a spirited defense of substance dualism, a model of consciousness that has fallen out of fashion with most academic philosophers. The authors also discuss the repercussions of dualism and its primary competitor, physicalism, on ethics and free will.
What are the arguments for dualism? Well, firstly, our mental states possess properties not held by our physical brains. For instance, if I close my eyes and imagine a green pasture, nothing in my physical brain turns green. Moreover, as my thought of a green pasture is not an empirical phenomenon, it cannot be verified by the methods of the hard sciences. It doesn't have an odor, a length, a height, a weight or a physical location in space.
Secondly, I am in a position to know my mental life in a way not available to anyone else. I, and I alone, am privy to my mental states. A brain surgeon may know more about my physical brain and its operations than I do, but he cannot know my mental life as well as I do. He doesn't experience my fear of being operated on, or my hope that I make it through the operation alive. Furthermore, I cannot be mistaken about my mental states. If I have an experience of a grey rug, the rug itself may actually be white due to poor lighting. But I cannot be mistaken that I am experiencing what I take to be a grey rug.
Thirdly, our mental states possess the property of intentionality. The intentionality of our mental states is the most powerful argument against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Our mental states possess the property of aboutness or ofness. We don't just think; we think "about" or "of" something. Our thoughts point beyond themselves to objects and things, even those that don't exist. Intentionality is troublesome for the physicalist, for how can our brain waves be "about" or "of" anything? If a neuroscientist could examine the brains of two classical music lovers, how could he tell one was thinking about the melodies of Bach and the other of Beethoven?
And finally, the most interesting argument for dualism is the argument from qualia. When we see a red apple, it "looks" red. When we taste a chocolate bar, it tastes "chocolatey." When we smell a rose it smells "rosy." Philosophers call such things as the look of red, the taste of chocolate, or the smell of a rose "qualia." Moreland and Rae argue that qualia are experiences within our minds. For example, every time you place a wedge of a lemon in your mouth, you experience the sour taste of lemon qualia. This is a correlation between physical qualities and mental qualia. The physical qualities of lemons are very different in nature from the mental qualia they are correlated with. The "taste" of a lemon is not itself anything like the chemical composition of a lemon -- although it is caused by the lemon's chemical composition.
Physicalism, in contrast with dualism, holds that our mental states are identical to our physical bodies. Some physicalists claim that if the mind is non-physical, it is not scientifically meaningful. But this objection fails for the simple reason that there exist many abstract objects that are non-physical. Numbers, for example, are abstract objects, having no weight, length or location in space. The numerals "5" and "V" each represent the number 5. In this case there are two numerals, but only one number -- the number 5 -- is expressed by the numerals. Also, if we are just matter, then we don't have free will. Our actions are determined by the laws of chemistry and physics, not our own human volition.
A great defense of substance dualism.
Rating: 4
Summary: A Good Introduction to Thomistic Dualism
Comment: I first came in contact with this work as I was preparing a response/critique to James P. Moreland's chapter in _The New Mormon Challenge_ (titled "The Absurdities of Mormon Materialism"). It was suggested to me by one of Moreland's friends and associates, Carl Mosser, as a good introduction to Thomistic dualism (as opposed to the better-known Cartesian dualism). I am now thankful for Carl's suggestion and this work.
The Thomistic view of the soul is, in my mind, more advanced and more cogent than the Cartesian view of the soul. It differentiates between spirit/soul and mind, presenting the latter as a faculty of the soul and not it's very essence. It provides a better explanation of the mind-body (or soul-body) problem by asserting that the soul is the teleological foundation of the formation of the body (i.e., the soul directs the growth and development of the body). Further, this view emphasizes the need for a working brain that can also affect the spirit/mind for cognitive occurrences (this point is argued more vigorously in works outside of _Body and Soul_ by other authors, though Moreland hints at it in this work).
The only disappointment for me was Moreland's insistence on critiquing the reductionistic class of materialism. For me, personally, the reductionists have too many theoretical problems to be a viable solution. I would have enjoyed a further critique of the emergent view of mind that is quickly becoming more prominent in scientific circles (Robert Nadeau, one of the reductionists that Moreland cites, has altered his conceptions towards this view; see _The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of the Mind_). Further, I wish Moreland (or anyone for that matter) would recognize panexperientialism as given by David Ray Griffin as a viable alternative to the dualist and physicalist perspectives (see Griffin's _Archetypal Process_ and _Unsnarling the World-Knot_; this is unlikely, even now, since process thought stands under very different metaphysical paradigms, immediately placing itself at odds with much philosophical thought in the last millennia). If anyone has any references of people who have referenced and critiqued this view I would be very appreciative (I can't give money, but my thanks will be sincere).
In line with the above: even though I am not a reductionist I still found some of Moreland's critiques unconvincing (this could be because I was reading my emergent/panexperientialist views into the reductionists' words). This does not mean that they are ineffective, only that I do not believe they hold the logical force that Moreland believes they do. One of the weaknesses of Moreland's words (at least in my opinion) is his bolstering of his own view as nearly impenetrable (he does make admissions, but they are few and not very pronounced) and the view of the materialists as fraught with problems. Both sides have difficulties that they must deal with, some which (admitted by some on both sides) may be unsolvable. Ultimately we probably could say, "Choose your poison."
Overall, I believe this is a wonderful book. I believe that Thomistic dualism is a vast improvement from Cartesian dualism and should be the focus of non-Christian critiques of dualism (and treated with more respect than many, unfortunately, are willing to give to Cartesian dualism).
Kevin Winters
P.S. This review comes strictly from reading Moreland's section of the book. Honestly, I cannot say anything, one way or another, on Rae's section.
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