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Title: Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest R. May ISBN: 0-8090-8854-1 Publisher: Hill & Wang Pub. Date: 03 October, 2001 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $15.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 3.74 (23 reviews)
Rating: 2
Summary: Intellectually Dishonest
Comment: In Strange Victory, Harvard professor Ernest R. May delivers a revisionist hypothesis about the German conquest of France in May 1940: the French were not doomed to defeat and the result could have gone the other way. May argues that incredible luck and faulty Allied intelligence were two of the main ingredients of this "strange victory" of the weaker over the stronger. Actually, May presents two related counter-factual hypotheses: first, that if France had launched a serious offensive in September 1939 that Nazi Germany might have "imploded" and second, that with better intelligence the French would have expected the panzer thrust through the Ardennes Forrest and moved to block it. While May has put a great deal of research into building his hypotheses, it is camouflage for a fundamentally dishonest intellectual approach. In order for a hypothesis to be credible, it should be tested against alternative evidence, but May eschews this methodology. In short, May only provides information that supports his hypotheses, but ignores information that does not.
The hypothesis that France could have launched an offensive to reach the Ruhr in September 1939 and thereby end the war at the outset is attractive but fanciful. France entered the war without an offensive doctrine or plan. When the French did attempt minor probes in the Saar on 7-11 September, they were stopped dead by the German introduction of deadly anti-personnel mines - which May fails to mention. Even if the French had possessed more offensive spirit in 1939, the odds were distinctly against success. The French armored divisions (DCRs) did not yet exist and the bulk of any offensive would rely on traditional infantry divisions, supported by a few motorized and cavalry units. May suggests that it would have been easy for the French to reach the Ruhr after only a few days of fighting against second-rate German Landwehr units. He fails to mention that it was 230 kilometers to the Ruhr and that the Rhine River would have to be crossed first - no small matter. The French 3rd and 4th Armies could have attacked with 8-13 divisions against 5-8 German divisions in prepared positions, representing odds of only 3:2 and without the benefit of surprise or air superiority. May completely ignores the ability of the Germans to redeploy units from the Polish front to blunt any French breakthrough. Worse still, May completely ignores the possibility that a premature French offensive in 1939 might have caused excessive casualties among the best French units, just as happened with Plan XVII in 1914.
Certainly the most critical element of May's hypothesis about May 1940 is his attribution of German surprise to French non-predictive intelligence methods. However, even if French intelligence had anticipated the German main effort at Sedan, May's assertion that the French response would definitely have resulted in a German defeat is absurd. This hypothesis is flawed on many levels. If the French had reinforced Sedan they might have block Guderian, but the French line would have been weakened in Belgium; the German timetable might have been upset, but they would probably have broken through elsewhere. May ignores the fact that German panzer forces outfought the Allies in Greece in North Africa in 1941-2 where luck and surprise were less important. Better intelligence would not have altered the torpid pace of Allied decision-making, their lack of air superiority or their faulty doctrine.
Given the author's apparent meticulous research, the number of obvious factual errors is rather disturbing. Since much of this information is available in secondary sources, I suspect that the errors were intentional distortions by the author to twist facts to support his hypotheses. In order to bolster the perception of French tactical prowess, the author exaggerates French tactical success in order to suggest that the French could have won. Actually, the Luftwaffe fighters clearly out-performed French fighters during the Phoney War period and the author's repeated use of a single incident on 6 November 1939 where the Germans lost 4 fighters to 1 French fighter is a fraudulent use of statistics (why not mention the action on 31 March 1940 where the Germans shot down 6 French fighters for no loss). The author's assertion that the tank battle at Gembloux was a "clear-cut French victory" is a flat-out lie, which no other account supports. At Fort Eben Emael, May claims that 55 out of 85 German glider troops were killed in the assault, but the actual number was 6 (a 900% exaggeration). May claims that the British counterattack at Arras "temporarily routed" Rommel's 7th Panzer but this is clearly false; the 7th Panzer was surprised and suffered losses but the attempt to compare a few German anti-tank gunners running away under fire with entire French units surrendering is dishonest. May fails to note that the British lost 30 tanks at Arras - 10 more than the "routed" Germans - and failed to stop the German march to the coast. Finally, the author's description of Erwin Rommel's First World War experience as, "primarily a behind-the-lines commando" is absurd and intended to denigrate his ability to lead armor.
While the author's comments on the French failure to use predictive intelligence are interesting, there is no evidence that this failure was unique. Certainly, if the Americans had anticipated the Pearl Harbor or World Trade Center attacks, history would have turned out differently, but we don't need a Harvard professor to tell us the obvious. Predictive intelligence is necessary but far more difficult than the author implies and it is a common failing of many intelligence agencies.
It is also very odd that the author makes no attempt to compare the May 1940 Campaign with Desert Storm in 1991, which had many similarities. Might Iraq have done better if it had launched a hasty attack into Saudi Arabia in 1990? Might Iraq have defeated the American "left hook" with predictive intelligence? The omission appears deliberate. May's hypotheses are not substantiated and his methods are deceptive.
Rating: 4
Summary: Dramatic Reinterpretation
Comment: Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, "Strange Defeat", about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of.
In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances?
Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field.
Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? One will have to decide on their own answers. It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.
Thoroughly researched, Ernest May writes a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Besides his point of view to be read and pondered, several intriguing pictures and maps are included.
Rating: 5
Summary: Brilliant Scholarship
Comment: I was amazed to find this book so shabbily reviewed! This is a work of brilliant scholarship and well written. One of the reviewers commented that the book is not original and that the fall of France was not strange. Originality exists on different levels. That human failings were behind the fall of France was commented upon almost immediately, beginning virtually on day one with Churchill's "The battle of France is over; the Battle of Britain must now begin" speech. But to document these failings, to detail the mistakes made, to prove that it was human failings at the heights of command in the French Army and polity, rather than equipment failures or unusual brilliance of the German high command, are no mean feat. Moreover, May's research is exhaustive. So many scholars today have a theory and tailor the research to support that theory. To this they add footnotes and a lengthy bibliography to convince the reader that they have been scholarly. This is not what May has done. He has pieced together from thousands of sources a very complex story, which has enabled him to tell that story "the way it really happened." Anybody who does that, especially in this day of jet-set historians, deserves the highest accolades. I doubt that any of the reviews given here are by people with May's expertize on the subject; yet they have the temerity of to dump on him. With a work like this, the only justifiable criticism is to find factual discrepancies, citing source and page. Noticeably, there are none in the reviews submitted.
Professor May has written an excellent book and he is to be praised and congratulated on his achievement.
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Title: Strange Defeat by Marc Bloch ISBN: 0393319113 Publisher: W.W. Norton & Company Pub. Date: 01 July, 1999 List Price(USD): $13.95 |
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Title: Up From Conservatism by Michael Lind ISBN: 0684831864 Publisher: Free Press Pub. Date: 01 July, 1997 List Price(USD): $13.00 |
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Title: The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Modern World S.) by Julian Jackson ISBN: 019280300X Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: 01 June, 2003 List Price(USD): $26.00 |
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Title: France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 by Julian Jackson ISBN: 0199254575 Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: 01 April, 2003 List Price(USD): $18.95 |
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Title: Conquest of New Spain (Classics S.) by B. Diaz Del Castillo ISBN: 0140441239 Publisher: Penguin Books Pub. Date: 01 August, 1963 List Price(USD): $13.00 |
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