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Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy (Great Campaigns of the Civil War)

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Title: Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy (Great Campaigns of the Civil War)
by Richard M. McMurry
ISBN: 0803232128
Publisher: Univ of Nebraska Pr
Pub. Date: November, 2000
Format: Hardcover
Volumes: 1
List Price(USD): $35.00
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Average Customer Rating: 5

Customer Reviews

Rating: 5
Summary: MARCHING THROUGH GEORGIA REVISITED
Comment: Richard McMurry writes an interesting account covering the1864 military and political events in North Georgia stating "Gettysburg had brought no alteration in the relative strength or position of the opposing armies or in the course of the war" noting that Union successes at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga boosted Northern morale and assured that southerners couldn't gain a military victory and secure Federal recognition of Confederate independence. The author outlines the responses of the Confederacy and Union to this strategic dilemma with a narration of Sherman's North Georgia campaign that ultimately resolved the problem.

Lincoln appointed Grant commander of the Federal Armies and Jefferson Davis appointed Joseph E. Johnston, a general he did not trust; commander of the Army of Tennessee and the text states "All the Rebels would pay a very high price for Jefferson Davis long-standing evasion of the command personnel problems in the West." The author makes the fascinating observation that " By 1864 two irrefutable facts about the conflict should have been clear....neither side was likely to win the war in Virginia. The Confederates were too skilled to loose, at least as long as Lee lived, but not strong enough to win.The Northerners...were too strong to lose the war in Virginia but not skilled enough to win it there."

McMurry notes that Grant having nearly achieved military victory in the West, Grant made two decisions that made a Northern victory costly while enhancing Confederate independence chances. The strategy in Virginia to defeat Lee and prevent moving Rebel troops elsewhere; and two, appointing Sherman in Georgia instead of Thomas. Both decisions resulted in "Ten of thousands of Americans --North and South-- paid for this misjudgment with their lives...." and "The outcome of the war remained doubtful much longer..." The author observes that Thomas finished the war as a general "who never suffered defeat on a battlefield where he was in command" concluding "On the basis of his record, Sherman did not merit such a promotion...."

Both Sherman and Johnston had command personnel problems. Johnston inherited a command muddle which one historian described as a "pit of vipers". The narrative and analysis of Sherman's campaign from North Georgia to Atlanta is informative. Sherman dependence on the Western & Atlantic Railroad limited his strategic options to only advancing toward Atlanta because that was where the railroad ran.

The writer makes the intriguing statement that Union General McPherson's seizure of Snake Creep Gap on May 7th probably "determined the outcome of the campaign." adding the fascinating opinion "....if Grant had allowed Thomas to succeed to the command of the Military Division of Mississippi by seniority, the 1864 campaign in Georgia would have ended two or three weeks after its opening with "....a crushing Federal victory that, for all practical purposes would have ended the war in the West....ripping open the entire center of the Confederacy" and "save many lives during the last eleven months of the war."

As the campaign proceeded, Johnston would fortify a strong position and hope Sherman would attack. Sherman was not going to launch a massive assault against strong fortifications and moved against the Confederate left and flanked them out of every prepared position including Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Smyra. On July 8 Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee and the battle for Atlanta was imminent.

Davis replaced Joe Johnson with Hood on July 18, 1864 and the text notes "Rarely has a general assumed command of an army under more inauspicious circumstances than those facing John Bell Hood.... His army was backed up to a city it had to hold" which limited his strategic options and maneuvering room. Hood reversed Johnston's conservative policy striking Sherman at Peachtree Creek, Atlanta and Ezra Church but failed to cripple or destroy the opposing force.

Sherman ,after trying artillery for several days, realized the only way to force Atlanta's evacuation was to cut off all rail traffic into and out of the city. Interestingly, the text also notes "Hood too, sought some means of ....forcing his opponent to give up his position at Atlanta." Hood initiated an unsuccessful cavalry raid on railroads supporting the Federals. Sherman finding cavalry ineffective against railroads used infantry to cut the Macon & Western Railroad isolating Atlanta and Hood forcing the Rebels to abandon Atlanta. The Rebels after opening government warehouses to anyone (military or civilian) to take food, clothing etc.the Rebels burned what they couldn't take with them including five locomotives and 28 freight cars containing ammunition which exploded leveling adjacent buildings in a scene well depicted in the movie Gone With The Wind. Hood's infantry cleared Atlanta by 01:00 AM, September 2. Shortly after daylight Mayor James Calhoun rode north of Atlanta and surrendered the city.

The author concludes with an excellent analysis of the generalships of Sherman, Johnston and Hood noting that Sherman as a field general was "probably not much above average". However, by 1864 Sherman had developed a grasp of the geopolitical-psychological strategy, matched by few, realizing that a war can be won "by destroying the enemy's society and its logistical-economic-social infrastructure and he put that doctrine into practice on a grand scale...." McMurry states Davis contributed to the Rebel command failures in Georgia through his failure to involve himself in western matters.

McMurry concludes "Grant's much-vaunted plan did not work" and "It was a Confederate policy....that kept Lee from sending troops to reinforce the Rebels in Georgia, not the pressure of Grant's assaults on the Confederates in Virginia." Failure of Grant's plan resulted in tens of thousands of casualties.

A strong point throughout this work are the brief parallel accounts given of military and political activities in other areas providing a balanced account of the situations facing both Northern and Southern governments and their commanders. The books ends with two appendices analyzing Grant's strategy and Johnston's railroad strategy plus two excellent appendices titled "Numbers and Losses" and "The Atlanta Campaign and the Election of 1864".

Rating: 5
Summary: Novel and fascinating perspective
Comment: Lots of military historians have gone over this ground, but McMurry takes an iconoclastic stance that yields fascinating results.


His broad argument is that Grant made an error in putting Sherman in charge of the "west" rather than Thomas. Grant made a second, and related, error in personally directing Meade, while leaving Sherman to himself. These goofs caused many thousands of lives on both sides. The war could have been brought to an end much sooner had the full weight of the federals been put behind a drive to and then beyond Atlanta, under Thomas' leadership and perhaps with Grant's supervision, with Meade left in control of the Army of the Potomac.

On the confederate side, I see this book as rehabilitating Hood, and as driving a stake through whatever remains of Joe Johnston's once-high but always undeserved reputation.

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