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Title: Last Chance for Victory by Scott Bowden, Bill Ward ISBN: 0-306-81261-4 Publisher: DaCapo Press Pub. Date: 03 June, 2003 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $20.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 4 (31 reviews)
Rating: 5
Summary: Fantastic book about Lee's decision making during Gettysburg
Comment: This book is really fantastic. Several books do exist that presents more details about the actual battle, whereas this book assumes that the reader has at least a certain degree of previous knowledge of Gettysburg.
However this book is really fantastic in the description and the analysis of Lee's plans and decision making during the Gettysburg campaign.
It analyses the information available at the time the decisions were made and makes clear what the possible choices were.
It is a fundamental book to understand Lee's art of war and his and his lieutenants behaviour during the battle.
Rating: 4
Summary: A Thoughtful Consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg
Comment: It is instructive to read Bowden and Ward's study, "Last Chance for Victory," because the book takes issue with much recent scholarship about the Battle of Gettysburg and of the factors which led to Southern defeat. Many students attribute the result of the battle to Southern overconfidence and to mistakes in judgment by the Confederate high command, particularly Robert E.Lee.
Bowden and Ward draw a basic distinction in their study between command decisions on the one hand and the execution of these decisions on the other hand. They conclude that Lee was actively involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, on both the first and the second day, and that the failures on these days were failures of execution by Lee's subordinates. For example, Jeb Stuart's disobedience to Lee's orders early in the campaign, Richard Ewell's failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill, A.P. Hill's failure to timely advance his divisions on July 2 as part of Lee's en echelon plan of attack.
Bowden and Ward exonerate James Longstreet, in agreement with most recent studies of Gettysburg, of dilatoriness on the second day of the battle. But they are highly critical of Longstreet's performance on July 3 and come too close to accusing Longstreet of responsiblity for the failure of Pickett's charge. Bowden and Ward also criticize Lee for delegating too much responsiblity to Longstreet on day 3, particularly when he knew that Longstreet opposed the frontal assault, and for failing to assume direct control of the charge himself.
The aim of the study is polemical, in good part. The book is longer than it needs to be and many sections are too argumentative. Some of the argument I found unconvincing, which is not necessarily a bad thing in a book on a subject as controversial and difficult as the Battle of Gettysburg.
The book has some outstanding virtues. The writing is clear (although the book is marred by many typos). When Bowden and Ward get down to explaining the specifics of the battle, the writing is informative, consise, and not overly bogged-down in detail. After reading the account of the fighting on July 1 and July 2, I thought I understood the confusing action of these days better than I had before. The maps in the book are helpful. The authors do a good job relating Lee's military strategy at Gettysburg to military theory, particularly as developed in the Napoleonic campaigns.
This is not the only book a student of the Battle of Gettysburg should read because Bowden and Ward write from a standpoint presupposing some familiarity in the reader with recent accounts of the Battle. One of the cardinal virtues of the book is that it serves to remind the reader that there are many sides to a story. In any kind of serious study, it is good to learn to withhold judgment until one has considered a variety of points of view. This is a lesson in studying Gettysburg or in any serious study and the book teaches it well.
I learned a great deal from this book but came away not entirely convinced. The main difficulty I have with Bowden and Ward's argument is that they try to separate too sharply the orders that Lee gave and his battle plan from the execution of these plans by his subordinates. The plan and the execution were closely related at many critical points of the battle. The shortcomings in execution by Lee's subordinates cannot be sharply distinguished from Lee's orders. In spite of what Bowden and Ward argue, many of these orders were ambiguous and were so viewed by those to whom they were directed. Further Lee had the opportunity to rectify many of the dilatory actions of his subordinates (or many of their actions which perhaps did not accord with his orders) but did not do so. For example, Lee could have been much more explicit with Ewell about capturing Cemetry Hill to remove any grounds for doubt and could have followed-up agressively with him. Lee had the opportunity to tell A.P. Hill to correct his formations on July 2 and to have his (Hill's) subordinate commanders move more decisively following the actions of Longstreet's Corps. He did not do so. There was a great deal of difficulty to go around in the Confederate battle plan and in its execution in these three momentous days. In addition, as Bowden and Ward realize, there was the Union Army. When these factors are considered, Bowden and Hill can be read as modifying but not radically changing scholarly consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Bowden and Ward try to foist responsiblity for the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3 on Longstreet. There is nothing in their brief treatment of day 3 of the battle that convinces me that Pickett's charge had much chance of success or that Longsteet was to blame for the conception of the attack or for its execution. I don't understand that Bowden and Ward contend that the attack would likely have succeeded if it had been executed as they claim Lee had planned. I think the treatment of the third day of the battle is the weakest portion of this book.
This book will help the student rethink the Battle of Gettysburg and to learn the value of deliberation before one draws overly firm and dogmatic conclusions about a difficult matter.
Rating: 1
Summary: Last Chance for Victory is my Last Choice
Comment: (...)While it has interesting comments on the Gettysburg campaign, and much accurate, I question the validity of their historical research. A much more interesting approach is found in "Lee's Real Plan at Gettyburg."
I usually make a lot of notations when I read. In this case...I did not.
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Title: Gettysburg by Stephen W. Sears ISBN: 0395867614 Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Co Pub. Date: 24 June, 2003 List Price(USD): $30.00 |
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Title: Gettysburg : A Testing of Courage by Noah Andre Trudeau ISBN: 0060193638 Publisher: HarperCollins Pub. Date: 18 June, 2002 List Price(USD): $34.95 |
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Title: The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War by Brent Nosworthy ISBN: 0786711477 Publisher: Carroll & Graf Pub. Date: June, 2003 List Price(USD): $35.00 |
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Title: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg by Troy D. Harman ISBN: 0811700542 Publisher: Stackpole Books Pub. Date: August, 2003 List Price(USD): $19.95 |
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Title: Hallowed Ground : A Walk at Gettysburg by James M. McPherson ISBN: 0609610236 Publisher: Crown Pub. Date: 13 May, 2003 List Price(USD): $16.00 |
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