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Title: The Illusion of Conscious Will by Daniel M. Wegner ISBN: 0-262-73162-2 Publisher: MIT Press Pub. Date: 01 September, 2003 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $17.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 4 (16 reviews)
Rating: 3
Summary: Workmanly, helpful step forward on a central question
Comment: Wegner makes an interesting step forward in the free will/determinism debate. He argues that "conscious will" is indeed an important EXPERIENCE, which serves vital purposes; but he denies that ACTS of conscious will CAUSE the actions we believe them to cause. "Will" is not how I bring about the things I do, but perceiving and understanding what I do--though the "I" is mostly unconscious, and the causes of actions more or less entirely so.
Thus, Wegner does NOT deny that we are the authors of our own actions or that thoughts cause actions; but he denies that "will" is among the causally effective psychological events. "Will" is a way of keeping track of which actions are caused by me--by my intentions, beliefs, desires, and so forth. It is an indicator, and a vitally important one, but not more than that.
I will be surprised if this this theory turns out to be ultimately correct, mostly because Wegner seems to lack an adequate general theory of consciousness and its functions within which to house and understand will. Consciousness did not arise for no reason--any trait that occurs at a rate above chance must be naturally selected, hence evolutionarily important, and consciousness occurs in about 100% of humans and apparently huge numbers of other animal species. Consciousness could turn out to be just sort of a matter of taste, effectively useless, like the peacock's tail. But that seems unlikely, since consciousness seems to be much more universal that shiny big tails. Conscious will needs to be understood as part of consciousness, and very good science--theoretical and experiemtnal--demonstrates that consciousness has causal efficacy. (See, for instance, Bernard J. Baars' nice intro to "consciousness science" in his book, "In the Theater of Conscousness.")
That said, the feeling of willing remains distinct from other elements of consciousness--simply because each type of mental content is distinct from each other type--and thus much needs to be understood about its peculiar traits and function. Wegner certainly points in intriguing directions.
Two disappointment: First, and fairly trivial, Wegner knows very well that his theory is very, very far from being established, or even being the leading contender, and he often says so--e.g., that the evidence is "consistent with" the theory, or "suggests" the theory, or that the theory "would help" undertand various things. But being human, he can't avoid slipping into assuming and talking as though his theory is simply right--sometimes calling it an "assumption" and a "realization" in the same paragraph! I found the latter annoying.
More significant, Wegner sidesteps one central issue: Why does "will" feel free? We all know that we sometimes initate actions without feeling free to do otherwise--whenever "curiousity gets the better" of you, for instance. Other times we experience ourselves as free to will one thing or the other. Saying that will is perception of my causing my own acts does not explain the difference--and that difference is one of the main things the free will/determinism debate is about.
Rating: 4
Summary: Any volunteers?
Comment: Wegner postulates our belief in complete control of our voluntary actions is an illusion. Who, then, is in control of our thoughts and behaviour? In an ideal scientific portrayal of how our minds work all the relevant factors might be analysed in detail and reassembled to duplicate the processes leading to a particular action. That, he argues, isn't a practical solution to understanding. "Free will", debated by religions, science, philosophy and law, is too simplistic a concept in Wegner's view. There are too many forces impinging on our minds, affecting our behaviour and outlook, to endorse our commonly held view of how much we control we actually exercise. In a well written account of how these outside forces are received and acted on, Wegner presents an abundance of examples. His easygoing style makes this book a pleasurable read.
Anyone seeking simple concepts will not find this book fulfilling. There are many facets to examine in determining how our minds work. Simple answers and concepts have no place here. On the surface, his examples of outside forces may seem bizarre to the newcomer to these ideas. The famous horse, Clever Hans, who fooled many for years, may seem out of place in a study of human will. How can animal actions be meaningful in such a treatise? The example points up, however, how subtle the forces affecting our thoughts and actions can be. Human brain malfunctions also show the distinction between what we view as "normal" and "aberrant" behaviour. In examining some of these conditions, Wegner leads us through spirit mediums, Oujia Boards, "channeling", and hypnotism. It seems like a journey through a fantasy land, but each example makes a telling point in supporting his case that the idea that our actions remain within our control is illusory.
None of this is to suggest, he argues finally, that we have no influence on what we do. He merely wants to make us aware of those other forces. Some are easily understood, but easily overlooked - social forces are the chief example. "Have another piece of pie" repeated until we partake, seemingly "against our will". Not telling off the boss when she's been foolish. The examples are common and frequent, Wegner notes, but we don't view them as modifying our concept of "free will" as we should. In conclusion, Wegner urges that the idea of conscious will is a valid ideal. We should aim to achieve it, even if it's not universally attainable. While our knowledge of how conscious of ourselves we truly requires further explanation, Wegner's summary of will gives us another step along that journey. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating: 3
Summary: Really underdetermined and of narrow scope.
Comment: In brief, this book doesn't make a necessary case for the illusion of freewill for several reasons. First, the evidence that the author cites could be turned on it's head and used to argue for "freewill" type action from an evolutionary perspective. Second, some studies he cites like Libets also have alternative interpretations and these studies really seem to deal more with subconscious and passive processes than active volition (see Schwartz and Begley's book called "The Mind And The Brain" for more on active volition). Third, if freewill does exist, it's compatible with modern physical theory but isn't compatible with materialism despite what compatiblists try to assert. This is an ontology relative notion so one needs to be careful. Forth, there is no privilege beyond its current political clout to the materialist ontology, in fact it is a very inadequate and incoherent position with respect to consciousness. You'll find nothing but specious arguments and obscurantism dressed up in technical language -- all being done to "save" materialism. Anyway, so much more on other ontology's and the mind needs to be fairly considered through out this work. For instance, with libertarian freewill the _action_ of choice isn't necessarily caused by antecedents. This isn't the temporal notion that you find in determinism which implies an actual infinite regress in time. In other words, there is no beginning to time, which is contrary to what most cosmologists think. These regresses are considered irrational since they lead to all sorts of absurdities. In an infinite past how would one have the time to ever get to the here and now? Of course this implies a timeless and immaterial entity prior to the beginning of time and those typically are of two kinds, abstract mathematical concepts in a Platonic realm OR minds. However, abstract mathematical concepts don't enter into causal relations but that is not the case with thinking about minds. This leaves the possibility that the universe was caused by an eternal mind-like entity which some view as God. Now, from a dualists perspective are human minds/souls likewise given absolute freedom? Many would probably say that freedom is relative since humans have freedom of choice except over God, which is after all omnipotent and the only absolutely free entity. But besides the exercise of God's will over man, humans do have freewill. Anyway much more needs to be said than what this book offers.
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Title: Freedom Evolves by Daniel C. Dennett ISBN: 0670031860 Publisher: Viking Press Pub. Date: 10 February, 2003 List Price(USD): $24.95 |
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Title: Strangers to Ourselves : Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious by Timothy D. Wilson ISBN: 0674009363 Publisher: Belknap Pr Pub. Date: 30 September, 2002 List Price(USD): $27.95 |
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Title: The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them by Owen Flanagan ISBN: 0465024602 Publisher: Basic Books Pub. Date: 28 May, 2002 List Price(USD): $27.50 |
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Title: Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy by Patricia Smith Churchland ISBN: 026253200X Publisher: MIT Press Pub. Date: 02 December, 2002 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
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Title: The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature by Steven Pinker ISBN: 0670031518 Publisher: Viking Press Pub. Date: 26 September, 2002 List Price(USD): $27.95 |
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