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Title: Lutzen and Bautzen 1813: The Turning Point (Campaign, 87) by Peter Hofschrorer ISBN: 1-85532-994-8 Publisher: Osprey Military Pub. Date: 01 May, 2001 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $18.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 2.33 (3 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: A well organized analysis
Comment: This is the second Campaign Series book I've read by this author and found it to be very engaging. Mr. Hofschrorer does a good job of outlining the herculenean task Napolean faced in rebuilding the Grand Armee after 1812. He effectively drives home the point of the Emporer's dwindling resources (manpower, horses, etc) and the level of depandancy France had on their conscripts.
There's a great deal that when on over the course of this campaign and I found it helpful the way the author summarized the events after he provided the detail and then added some analysis to help the reader understand the impact of these events.
Another important point that was made clear was the impact of the Allied indecision / squabbling, as well as the poor decision making by both Napolean and his Marshalls. Too often there is a tendancy to cannonize one group and scape goat the other; it was nice to see both parties treated as fallable human beings.
This book is an enjoyable and informative read and sets the stage nicely for the authors's Leipzig book.
Rating: 1
Summary: 'Wrecked Guns and Wounded Prisoners'
Comment: The Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were the baptism of fire for Napoleon's newly raised army of 1813, which replaced the wreck of the Grande Armee of 1812, lost in Russia. It was built around it's survivors, those tough, indomitable fighting men the Emperor termed his 'men of bronze' which nothing, man nor nature, could overcome. The campaign was also the initiation of the 'new and improved' Prussian army that had been carefully nurtured and trained after the disaster of 1806, where the old Prussian army was destroyed by Napoleon and the Grande Armee 'In three weeks of unrelenting maneuver, battle, and marching.'
Epic tales deserve epic retelling. Unfortunately, this isn't it. Instead of the balanced, well-researched, and well-written account I was expecting, I found a biased, jingoistic, and, in my opinion, inaccurate and blindy pro-Prussian account of this campaign.
There are three areas where this work fails. First, the text is peppered with errors regarding Napoleon and the Grande Armee. Second, there are several thumping errors which resurrect old myths that have already been effectively countered by first-hand evidence and other, more careful historians who are recognized authorities in their field. Third, and most disturbing, the volume presents a theory of pan-Germanic unity that did not exist in 1813 and that didn't become a reality until 1870. What is effectively left out is the major contribution of Napoleon's German allies, most notably Wurttember, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, to the campaign.
The following minor errors are both puzzling and noteworthy: French conscripts are called 'Marie-Louise's', a nickname that was applied in 1814, not 1813; French heavy cavalry is listed as cuirassiers and dragoons, but neglects the carabiniers; two calibers are given for the French artillery, but three are listed; Old and Young Guard infantry are mentioned, omitting the Middle Guard, appropriate for 1815, not 1813; a French aide-de-camp is called an adjutant, proper in German, not in French-in the Grande Armee an adjutant was a senior NCO, not an officer. Most importantly, the decisive French artillery assault at Lutzen, led by Druout and which gutted the allied center, is conspicuously omitted from the text.
The old spectre of Napoleon being jealous of his subordinates and not giving them their just due is raised again in this volume. The author states that Napoleon 'did little to encourage initiative among his subordinates lest a rival should emerge', that he 'needed to be seen as the sole victor in his battles', and that he 'could not allow his subordinates to play too big a role in achieving the victories.' This is contradicted by both Ferdinand von Funck and Ernst Odeleben, Saxon officers attached to the Grande Armee, noted as impartial and insightful observers. Von Funck remarked that 'Napoleon had the gift...of training commanders.' Historian John Elting remarked that Napoleon's generals aides-de-camp were trained in Napoleon's own methods of warfare, and there is myriad evidence in Napoleon's Correspondence which contradicts these statements. The old belief that Napoleon had a number of 'his veterans tied down in garrisons...in Central Europe' has been categorically disproven by John Elting, the authority on the Grande Armee. He states that most of the troops in those garrisons only became veterans during the respective sieges.
The old myth of the German 'War of Liberation' is also brought to the forefront again, when in fact liberation meant occupation and annexation by Prussia. Half of Saxony, with their king imprisoned by the allies, the Rhineland, and most of what had been Westphalia was ingested by the expansionist Prussians as a result of the wars. The contention that in 1813 'the population of Prussia was a seething mass of resentment with a strong desire to avenge the humiliations of 1806' is a bit overstated. Resentful they might have been, but comparatively few wanted to risk being shot at and force had to be used to enforce conscription in many places in Prussia. The soldier poet, Theodor Korner, an officer in Lutzow's Free Corps (later 'hunted down' and destroyed by Wurttemberg cavalry after violating the summer armistice) wrote an 'ode to Prussian draft-dodgers', 'Fie on thee boy, disguised with curls...'
There is reference to French looting and pillage, but, interestingly, none about the Prussian adventures in this area. Blucher, the Prussian commander, 'rather regarded looting-except in Prussia-with approval', and the Prussians gained a reputation 'for misbehavior and brutality.' A good summation of the Prussians, which would have enlighening for this volume, greatly ading to its credibility as a reference, is given by John Elting in Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV: 'Prussia was a predatory nation, eager to seize territory on any pretext or opportunity. Its soldiers were tough fighters, capable-if well led-of great exertions, tautly drilled and discip;ined. They were also arrogant in victory, remorseless looters and brutal in their plundering. In 1815 Belgians complained that the Prussians billeted on them were worse than Cossacks.' There are usually two sides to a story.
Finally, allied casualties are understated by a factor of two. The theory that these two allied defeats were the turning point of the campaign, the theme of the book, is ludicrous. Nothing new is covered here, and what is covered is neither thorough nor balanced. This volume, in my opinion, is unreliable as a reference. George Nafziger's Lutzen and Bautzen, a much better book, is recommended instead. This effort can only be summed up as an opportunity lost; and opportunity lost is opportunity gone forever.
Rating: 2
Summary: A Biased, Germanic Re-interpretation of Napoleonic History
Comment: Author Peter Hofschröer seems to be in business to prove that somehow, it was primarily through German force of arms that Napoleon's empire was brought down. This addition to the Osprey Campaign series, covering Napoleon's 1813 Spring campaign in lower Germany, is premised on the idea that Germany was somehow the key to everything. In his introduction, Hofschröer states that, "Napoleon needed the resources of Central Europe to sustain his dictatorship. His domination of Germany was of vital importance to the continuation of his dynasty." Right at the start of his account, Hofschröer demonstrates a fatal misconception - that Napoleon's power was based on territory rather than his army. Anyone with a fair understanding of Napoleon's empire should recognize the fallacy of this argument; Napoleon was strong as long as he had an effective army and as long as he had that tool, he could retake any ground temporarily lost. It would also be false to overstate the contributions of Napoleon's German allies in maintaining his power base.
This volume covers the period between the return of the defeated Grande Armée from Russia in January 1813 to the armistice in June 1813. During this period, Napoleon demonstrated amazing powers of recovery; despite suffering enormous losses in Russia, he was able to assemble a new, if poorly-trained army, to face the resurgent Prussians and Russians. This was a tremendous achievement, but gets only faint praise in this account. Napoleon then used this newly-assembled army to inflict two defeats on the Prussian-Russian forces at Lutzen and Bautzen. The defeated allies then asked for an armistice to regroup. Incredibly, the German-centric Hofschröer calls these two defeats "the turning point" because Napoleon failed to smash the allies completely. That's like calling Dunkirk a victory. It is ludicrous to call two consecutive defeats a turning point for one's cause. Granted, Napoleon's victories were not complete and he suffered heavy losses in both battles. Yet Napoleon had clearly demonstrated that he was not finished and that he was still quite deadly on the battlefield. Napoleon's plan for the Battle of Bautzen was excellent and only sloppy execution by Marshal Ney prevented another Austerlitz-style triumph. Hofschröer is clearly ignorant of the adage that wounded animals are the most dangerous of all.
Throughout this volume, the author demonstrates a very pedestrian style. Paragraphs are clogged with over-use of place names and names of commanders. Too much effort is spent telling the reader where various commanders marched, without saying much about what they did there. Surprisingly, there is no attempt to use primary sources to add detail to the battle accounts. Added to an opaque prose that is as clear as mud at times, is a complete breakdown of the normally excellent Osprey battle maps to graphically depict the action. First, there are far too few 2-D maps to support the overall campaign narrative; key phases such as the preliminaries to Lutzen and Ney's flank march at Bautzen cannot be adequately followed from the existing maps. Second, the 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps are badly flawed in this volume, particularly the two covering Bautzen. Most of the villages mentioned in the text, such as Ney's objectives of Preititz and Hockirch, are not even depicted on these maps. Compare these two maps with other standard maps of the Battle of Bautzen and it is amazing how much detail was left out. Without proper maps, this account bogs down.
Nor is geographic information the only omission. The author mentions the siege and capitulation of several French-held fortresses in Poland and Germany, but he neglects to mention that many of the French troops were released on condition not to fight for six months. Hence many of these troops would be available for the fall campaign. The author minimizes the death of Marshal Bessières on 1 May and totally misses the death of General Duroc on 22 May. Both these men were close associates of Napoleon and Duroc's death in particular had a great effect on him. The events pre-ceding Lutzen are misinterpreted as well; Napoleon did in fact order Ney to put out reconnaissance, which the later neglected to execute. Hofschröer blames Napoleon as well as Ney for this error.
It is fair to say that the spring 1813 Campaign in Germany was indecisive and was not a turning point. That is why both sides desired a cease-fire, in order to build-up their forces. It is also unfair to suggest that German troops who fought against Napoleon (as opposed to the thousands of German troops from Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Württemberg who fought for him) made any greater contribution to his eventual defeat than the Austrians, British, Spanish and Russians who had fought him to a standstill. This volume, which is based upon German chauvinistic hype, obscures the true meaning of the Lutzen-Bautzen campaign; Napoleon was still the best battlefield commander in Europe, even if his tools were no longer up to his imperial visions.
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