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Title: Vimeiro 1808: Wellesley's First Victory in the Peninsular (Campaign, 90) by Rene Chartrand, Patrice Courcelle ISBN: 1-84176-309-8 Publisher: Osprey Pub Co Pub. Date: September, 2001 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $18.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 4 (2 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: Adequate Account
Comment: This Osprey title provides an adequate account of the battle of Vimero in 1808. This was Wellsley's first major victory in the Peninsular, and as such is worth studying in some detail as it provides a blue-print for his future victories. I have often found the Osprey titles to be short on text, but high in price, although they do provide a nice synopsis of each subject they handle. I would agree in general with the reviwer above that Wellsely was not facing first-rate French troops or generals at this battle. Although pro-French advocates could say the same thing about Maida in 1806, Egypt 1801, and elsewhere in order to find excuses for French defeats against the British. Over the years there has grown a devoted following of Wellington in the Peninsular, due to books like Michael Glover's and Jac Weller's famous narratives. English readers of the period have developed a strong pro-British bias concerning the Peninsular War. This has been reinforced owing to a scarcity of reliable works in either Spanish or French. It is therefore good that the author spends some time outlining the initial Portugese aspects of the 1808 campaign.
The author does a nice job describing the opening battles of obidos and Rolica, often over-looked in any detail by general histories of the campagn. Here the Osprey OOBs and nice maps convey the action well and pointed out some deatils that I was not aware of concerning these actions.
Unfortunately for Vimero itself, the main topic of the book, the narrative falls somewhat short. The description of the battle itself is all too brief. Even the maps, while colorful are not as tactical as they should be. For such a small scale action one would think that very detailed maps for all the battalions involved would have been possible. The narrative simply describes the French assaults and their repulse with little detail. Some mention is made of the flanking movement and that the two French brigades were deployed in linear or mixed order formations, but nothing more is mentioned. More detail on this would have clarifed the old line vs column debate.
Despite the fact that the French may have been second-rate troops, they still believed in their superiority, and Junot was counting on this when he threw them at Wellsley's position at Vimero. I think all the hero worship over the years concerning the French marshalete has made them a bit into straw men. When Bonny was not around and faced with competent adversaries they often did not do as well. Certainly Junot was no Massena or Soult, but they really didn't fight that much differently in the tactical sense. Wellington was unique in that he was both a supurb strategist and tactician. Most of the French Marshals were decent to good strategists, but weak tactcially, except perhaps for Davout. Even Napolean never concerned himself that much with tactical matters after his campaigns in Italy. Wellington could do both.
The elements of the battle involved at Vimero would come back to haunt the French over and over again in the Peninsular. Poor recon of the British positions, hasty attacks in battalion or brigade columns, and no combined arms. Junot had a division of cavalry that was hardly used, despite the difficult terrian, and his 23 guns saw no action from what I can tell. Junot expected the vaulted French infantry to do it all. The author shows that the British repulsed the French columns with one or two massive vollies, followed by a determined advance with the bayonet. Quite different from the methodical platoon vollies we have often heard about from Oman and Weller. More on this would have been interesting.
While brief in content, this volume presents a nice, fairly detailed picture of the battle. The aftermath events leading up to the Coruna campaign are nicely shown. Overall a decent production, despite the high price for an 80 page book. The maps and OOBs are good for wargamers and students wanting a more detailed appreciation of these battles.
Rating: 4
Summary: Doesn't Quite Connect the Dots
Comment: As usual Rene Chartrand has put a good effort into his latest effort, on the campaign that began Arthur Wellesley's (AKA the Duke of Wellington) amazing career in the Iberian Peninsula. There is nothing particularly novel are striking in this account, but it provides an excellent summary of the campaign that began the British intervention in Spain and Portugal.
The book is set up a bit differently than other Osprey Campaign series titles because about one-third of the text is used to provide background on the campaign, beginning with the French invasion of Portugal in 1807 and the outbreak of popular rebellions in both Spain and Portugal. As usual, there are sections detailing the opposing commanders, armies and plans. One chapter covers the Battle of Rolica, another the Battle of Vimeiro and a third covers the Sintra Convention. Orders of battle are provided for the 1807 invasion, Rolica and Vimeiro. There are five 2-D maps showing the 1807 invasion, the rebellion in June-July 1808, the punitive expedition to Teixeira in June 1808, the British landing in August 1808 and a strategic map of the peninsula in the fall of 1808. There are three 3-D maps: the Battle of Rolica and two of Vimeiro. In addition, there are three battle scenes depicting British infantry attacking at Rolica, the charge of French grenadiers at Vimeiro and the British cavalry counterattack at Vimeiro. The maps of the Battle of Vimeiro are not small scale enough, which makes it difficult to comprehend the actual details of the French attack and British defense; a small-scale 2-D map should have been used to display opposing battalion dispositions.
Although Chartrand does a good job laying out the details of the French defeat, he fails to connect the dots. First, the French commander, Junot, seemed to violate as many principles of war as possible. Mass was not achieved because Junot failed to weight his main effort; he split his army into nearly equal halves and initially attacked 4,700 British troops in 6 battalions with only 4,200 French troops in 4 battalions. Surprise was lost through poor security, which allowed Wellesley to redeploy his troops, resulting in a French attack at no more than 1:1 odds. Junot's flanking maneuver was also detected and defeated. Over-confidence on the French side led to poor pre-battle reconnaissance and Junot was unaware of the British strength and dispositions. Compounding these failures, Junot failed to exploit his superiority in artillery and cavalry, while Wellesley made the most of his few guns and mounted troops. The only principle of war that the British violated was unity of command, which deprived them of pursuit but not victory. The French lost the battle because they violated the fundamentals of mass, surprise and security, not because columns can't beat lines. This "column versus line" argument has been exaggerated into a cult for too many years and ignores the principles of war. If Junot's columns had been properly massed at a point that Wellesley had not expected, the French would have broken the British lines. Chartrand is silent on these issues.
Why did Junot's army violate so many principles of war? The answer lies in inexperience, over-confidence and amateurish behavior. It is not brought out in this text, but most of the French units had seen little action before Portugal. Both the French 1/86 and 2/86 battalions had been sent on the disastrous expedition to Santo Domingo in 1802 and saw no action in the 1805-1807 campaigns in Europe. The 3/82nd had been raised from detachments in the West Indies and had only just returned to Europe after years of colonial duty. Of the units involved in the French main attack at Vimeiro, only the 3/32nd had served with la Grande Armée in 1805-1807. Much the same held true for the brigade and battalion-level officers, whom Chartrand does not discuss much. Brigadiers Thomiere and Charlot, who led the main attack, had both served in Italy in 1796-7 but had not commanded troops in the 1805-7 campaigns. Brigadiers Brenier and Solignac, who led the flank attack, also had Italian experience but little else. Junot's Army of Portugal was an ad hoc collection of inexperienced troops and limited-service officers. Of course, Napoleon had intended this force as an army of occupation in a remote corner of Europe, not as a first-line combat force. Thus, Wellesley's first taste of command was against an outnumbered and decidedly second-string French army. Yet if Wellesley had been attacked by troops under Marshal Davout or Lannes from the Grande Armee, the results would probably have been vastly different. The British army itself was still pretty inexperienced at continental maneuver war in 1808 and Napoleon made the mistake of continually sending inadequate, second-rate armies to deal with the British, which only gave the British valuable combat experience as they defeated one French army after another. Thus, Wellesley's great reputation built in the Peninsula was due at least as much to Napoleon's strategic short-sightedness as British tactical skill.
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