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Title: None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam by George W. Allen ISBN: 1-56663-387-7 Publisher: Ivan R Dee, Inc. Pub. Date: October, 2001 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $27.50 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.83 (6 reviews)
Rating: 5
Summary: ONE OF THE VERY BEST BOOKS ON VIETNAM
Comment: This is an exceptional book, absolutely required reading for the history of the Vietnam War since 1950 but also for the foreign policy decisionmaking process in general. A classic! Reinforces those who thought the war a tragic waste of human lives and resources--who opposed the war.
Rating: 5
Summary: Amazing book on US involvement in Vietnam
Comment: I have read a number of books on the US involvement in Vietnam, some of them quite good. This is the best, the ONE book you should read if you're limited to one book. Other recommended books are _To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Forty-Seven Americans and Southeast Asians_ by Al Santoli, and _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
With first-hand knowledge -- not just reading from second-hand sources or going through one general's papers -- George Allen describes what happened in Vietnam from before Dien Bien Phu through the fall of Saigon. He has detailed information on the US side, and informed accounts of what the North Vietnamese strategy was. He introduces us to the personalities and events so important to the way Vietnam happened, all in a very engaging and readable style.
One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the listing of the many times the US took action without a full examination of the complete situation. Allen writes, "In foreign affairs and national security matters, there is no substitute for thorough, conscientious, and objective analysis of all the factors bearing on a decision, of alternative courses of action, and of a weighing of the consequences -- domestic as well as foreign -- of all the options available." This was rarely done in Vietnam. Among the hasty decisions the US made were to consider the northern Vietnamese as part of a monolithic Communist threat, to aid the French in maintaining their empire, to take over the French role in Vietnam, to give the green light to the Diem coup, to not realize the problems the lack of post-Diem leadership would create, to not encourage South Vietnam to develop an effective political message and a stable appealing government, to appear to favor Thieu as a candidate (by proclaiming neutrality), by failing to build an effective intelligence system in south Vietnam, by US in-country personnel repeatedly lying to their superiors by exaggerating US success and minimizing enemy strength (thus depriving themselves of the needed resources to meet the real threat), by the false "light at the end of the tunnel" PR campaign (setting the government up for an even bigger fall when Tet '68 came), by giving South Vietnam false assurances of our post-withdrawal support, etc. etc.
These just touch the surface. Allen explains how even minor decisions like insisting ARVN units included artillery support, and not replacing ONE incompetent colonel, possibly had very significant bad effects. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Vietnam, recent American history, or politics. It should be required reading for US policy-makers.
Hopefully someday we'll have someone the caliber of George Allen tell the true story of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Rating: 5
Summary: Balanced Deep Trustworthy View of Policy-Intelligence Gaps
Comment:
This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy. While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books at Bruce Jones' "War Without Windows", Orrin DeForest's "SLOW BURN", Douglas Valentine's "The Phoenix Program", Jim Witz's "The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War", Tom Mangold & John Penycate's "The Tunnels of Chu Chi", and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's "Body of Secrets."
I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly "cooked the books." The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Loatian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.
This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excells at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.
This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail--rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.
He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for "due diligence" in decision-making, needs to read this book.
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Title: Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda by John Keegan ISBN: 0375400532 Publisher: Knopf Pub. Date: 21 October, 2003 List Price(USD): $30.00 |
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Title: The Main Enemy : The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB by James Risen, Milton Bearden ISBN: 0679463097 Publisher: Random House Pub. Date: 06 May, 2003 List Price(USD): $27.95 |
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Title: Ripples of Battle : How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think by Victor Hanson ISBN: 0385504004 Publisher: Doubleday Pub. Date: 16 September, 2003 List Price(USD): $27.50 |
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Title: The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons by Anthony H. Cordesman ISBN: 0892064323 Publisher: Praeger Publishers Pub. Date: September, 2003 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
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Title: Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps Nineteen-Forty by Ronald Schaffer, United States ISBN: 0897451120 Publisher: Sunflower University Press Pub. Date: August, 1996 List Price(USD): $28.95 |
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