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Title: Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium by Daniel Goure, Jeffrey M. Ranney, James R. Schlesinger, Daniel Doure ISBN: 0-89206-350-5 Publisher: Center for Strategic and International Studies Pub. Date: 15 November, 1999 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $18.95

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Average Customer Rating: 3.25 (4 reviews)

Rating: 1
Summary: The Simple Truth
Comment: So well-documented and persuasive that it is certain to be quoted extensively by the defense industry lobby for years to come. But the truth it presents is a simple one. A more complex truth would want to examine the doctrines that require the US to outspend the next 6 largest armed forces in the world COMBINED.

The Two Theater War Doctrine that was established during Cheney and Powell's last tenure (back when they were SecDef and C-JCS, rather than the VP and SecState) is the benchmark that all of these defense "requirements" are based on. Scrap that doctrine and the perception of a train wreck diminishes drastically. A less partisan examination of American defense spending would start by asking why the US is still spending at Cold War levels, why non-US military aid is a joke (in Pentagon terms, the amount of aid given is a rounding error, no more than that), and why weapons are seen as the be-all and end-all of security. The fact that Goure did not answer the hard questions puts this book on the same level as propaganda.

Dr. Defenestrator's Prescription: Don't read it; there's a good chance that US policymakers have already read it, and you'll no doubt hear it repeated verbatim repeatedly. Cindy Williams' "Holding the Line" offers an alternative view on the issue, and you should at least read the two books together if you must read Goure.

Rating: 4
Summary: Brilliant on Numbers, Need Same Focus on WHAT We Buy
Comment: The authors provide compelling evidence of a forthcoming "train wreck" in U.S. defensive capabilities, and make a compelling case for increasing the defense budget by $60-100B a year for a mixture of preserving readiness; acquiring mid-term capabilities needed to replace a 20-30 year old mobility, weapons, and communications base force; and implementing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is a well-documented and heavily fact-laden book-the authors as individuals and the case they make in general terms-must be heeded by the next President and the next Congress. Where the book does not go, and a companion book by the same authors would be of great value, is into the detail of WHAT threat, WHAT force structure. They accept, for example, the Navy's 304-ship Navy that keeps adding gigantic carriers and does nothing for littoral warfare or putting Marines within 24 hours of any country instead of 6 days. Similarly, they accept Air Force emphasis on fewer and fewer bigger and more sophisticated platforms of dubious utility in a 21st Century environment that requires long loiter, ranges of several hundred nautical miles without refueling, full lift in hot humid weather, and survivability in the face of electromagnetic weapons in the hands of thugs. This book demonstrates a clear mastery of defense economics, and it is an important contribution to the bottom line: our national defense is desperately underfunded, and this must be in the "top three" issues facing the 43rd President and the 107th Congress. What we buy, and why, has not yet been answered to my satisfaction.

Rating: 3
Summary: Waiting ... and hoping? ... for the Train Wreck
Comment: The central argument of Goure, et. al., is pretty straight forward: the Clinton administration has not spent enough money on "recapitalizing" the US military -- that is, hasn't replaced enough of the tanks, ships, and airplanes -- so everything will wear out about the same time, leaving the United States undefended, unable to defend its interests, and unfriended. That's the "pending train wreck." The argument is not new. Indeed, the analogy to a "defense train wreck" emerged shortly after the Clinton administration took office in the early 1980s, touted, strangely enough, by some disgruntled low ranking members of the preceeding Republican administrations. Partisanship aside, how does the argument stand up in the face of nearly a decade since it first emerged? The answer is mixed. When first voiced, the train wreck was going to take place before the end of the century. Goure's most recent warming over of the gruel now pushes it into the new century, suggesting that he and his predecessors might have let their resentment of the current administration cloud their understanding of the actual dynamics inside the Pentagon. But that noted, some of the trends they note do ring true and do support the contention that the US will face an unfortunate situation in which the relative lack of procurement over the last decade will reduce the readiness of the force because its equipment is wearing thin. To Goure and his fellow authors, this is a great shame, for it will make the world's most powerful military a hollow force. Here's the real limitation of the book, for it assumes the Cold War force the United States built and honed over half a century should be the standard for the future. But this Cold War force was built for an era that has passed, and has characteristics that make it ill suited to the present and future. It is a ponderous force, dedicated to a concept of "overwhelming" might, rather than a "smart" force that is agile, swift, and suited for the problems we face now. Goure and his colleagues are right about the remnants of the Cold War force running down (even though they seem to be wrong about the immediacy of the train wreck). Where they're significantly wrong, however, is in the notion that we need or want the kind of force they're so concerned about losing.