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Title: Operation Bluecoat: British 3rd Infantry Division/27th Armoured Brigade (Battleground Europe Normandy) by Ian Daglish ISBN: 0-85052-912-3 Publisher: Leo Cooper/Pen & Sword Books Pub. Date: 01 August, 2003 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 3 (1 review)
Rating: 3
Summary: Good on Tactical, but not Operational Level
Comment: Operation Bluecoat is surely one of the more obscure actions of the Second World War, but it is fortunate for historians that Pen & Sword has decided to address this heretofore-neglected subject as part of five new volumes on the British campaigns in Normandy in 1944. In his first volume for the Battleground Europe series, Ian Daglish describes the British VIII Corps offensive on 30 July-6 August 1944 that almost achieved a dramatic breakthrough of the German front. Overall, the volume is a good first effort, although not as well put together as other volumes in the series by Tim Saunders, Tim Kilvert-Jones or Carl Shilleto. Readers should note two immediate inaccuracies with the volume: first, that the subtitle "British 3rd Infantry Division/27th Armored Brigade" actually refers to the volume on "Sword Beach," since neither unit participated in Bluecoat. A second inaccuracy is the other subtitle - "the British Armored Breakout" - that did not, in fact, occur. By the end of Bluecoat, the German line had bent, but not broken.
The first two chapters in the volume deal with the development of an operation stalemate in Normandy and the genesis of the "Bluecoat" plan. It is clear from Daglish's narrative that while "Bluecoat" was conceived by Field Marshal Montgomery, that the plan was seen as an unwanted stepchild, since it did not fit into his campaign scheme of set-piece battles with predictable results (indeed, Montgomery virtually ignored the operation in his post-war memoirs). The major problem with Daglish's narrative of the operation - and it runs throughout the volume - is his failure to put Bluecoat in its proper operational perspective. While Daglish briefly discusses the American Operation Cobra, he fails to hammer home that Bluecoat was designed as a supporting effort to help the left flank of the main effort. American movements on the flanks of Bluecoat are only discussed in terms of inter-Allied cooperation problems, not in terms of any over-arching plan. In essence, Bluecoat was not a stand-alone operation, but it is almost presented that way, particularly due to the absence of any maps that depict American movements. Note also, that Daglish fails to provide an order of battle for either side.
The bulk of the volume consists of six narrative chapters that break Operation Bluecoat down, day by day. It is clear from this account that the British Army had begun to learn a few things after eight weeks in Normandy, and the early stages of Bluecoat demonstrated that the British had become masters of the set-piece battle. Unlike earlier attacks where the British had attacked elite SS units head-on, in Bluecoat Montgomery had deliberately shifted VIII Corps to attack one of the weakest units in the German line, the burnt-out 326th Infantry Division. Daglish notes that VIII Corps began its attack with only 200 infantrymen on an 800 meter-wide penetration front, with no artillery preparation. Tanks and engineers rapidly moved in to clear the German minefields and clear out the front-line positions. Amazingly, the Germans had not detected the arrival of large British forces on this quiet front almost a week earlier, and were caught by surprise. In fact, the Germans had very few anti-tank guns on this sector and had relied on the hedgerow terrain to deter an armored attack. The result was a British breakthrough of five miles on the first day and for once, the British boldly pushed forward armor units to seize key terrain in the German rear. Incredibly, the German army-level command did not appreciate the depth of the British penetration and was more focused on the American operations to the west.
Daglish has a knack for describing small unit actions, such as the German counterattack on Hill 226 on 30 July 1944. Three German Jagdpanther assault guns attacked the 40-odd Churchill tanks of the Scots Guards that were atop the hill and promptly knocked out 13 tanks, with no loss to themselves. Daglish's description of the seize of "Dickie's Bridge" by a five-man patrol of the Household Cavalry is also exciting reading, as well as highlighting the poor state of German command control by late July 1944. The Germans had made the classic mistake of putting their inter-corps boundary running through a forest, and then neither corps put any forces in place to block the road that ran through the forest. In short order, the British shoved part of the 11th Armored Division down this forest road, deep into the German lines. One British armored unit reached the outskirts of the town of Vire, a critical road hub, which the Germans had foolishly left unguarded. Thus, by the second day of battle, the British supporting offensive was beginning to offer the possibility of a major breakthrough.
Unfortunately for the British, the boldness that characterized their set-piece operations disappeared once the battle became more fluid. British armor commanders became reluctant to push deeply into the unknown, particularly with so many bypassed German units in their rear. The follow-on British armored unit, the Guards Armored Division, was particularly poor in armor-infantry cooperation (I was amazed by several quotes from field grade officers from that unit, to the effect that the Guards had never conducted joint armor-infantry training in England) and this renowned unit fumbled its way forward. Initially, the Germans failed to appreciate the extent of the British success, but once it became obvious that the VIII Corps was threatening to take Vire and achieve a real breakthrough, major resources were diverted to stop Operation Bluecoat in its tracks. The Germans committed the bulk of three SS Panzer Divisions to blunt the British attack. As usual, the British superiority in artillery and air power forced the Germans into a piece-meal counterattack, but the Germans were able to inflict substantial losses and save Vire. Confronted with large SS units to his front, Montgomery was forced to switch to the defensive on this front, thus ending Bluecoat without a breakthrough.
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Title: Operation Epsom: VIII British Corps V 1st Ss Panzerkorps (Battleground Europe Normandy) by Tim Saunders ISBN: 0850529549 Publisher: Leo Cooper/Pen & Sword Books Pub. Date: 01 August, 2003 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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Title: Walcheren: Operation Infatuate (Battleground Europe - Belgium and Holland) by Andrew Rawson ISBN: 0850529611 Publisher: Pen & Sword Books Pub. Date: 01 December, 2003 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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Title: Hill 112: Battles of the Odon (Battleground Europe) by Tim Saunders ISBN: 1580970567 Publisher: Combined Publishing Pub. Date: 01 April, 2001 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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Title: Mont Pincon: August 1944 (Battleground Europe Normandy) by Eric Hunt ISBN: 0850529441 Publisher: Leo Cooper/Pen & Sword Books Pub. Date: 01 January, 2004 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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Title: Operation Goodwood: Attack by Three British Armoured Divisions - July 1944 (Battleground Europe - Normandy) by Ian Daglish ISBN: 1844150305 Publisher: Pen & Sword Books Pub. Date: 01 June, 2004 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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