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Title: Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael E. O'Hanlon, Michael Ohanlon ISBN: 0-8157-6439-1 Publisher: The Brookings Institution Pub. Date: March, 2000 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $18.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 3.33 (3 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: A fascinating look at military technology
Comment: Throughout the twentieth century, warfare was revolutionized from the armies fielded by the British Empire during the Boer War to the high tech American army during the Persian Gulf War. It is the view of some, such as Alvin and Heidi Toffler, that the world is facing a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). In this book, the author examines the technology involved in military affairs, at the advances made in the past, and in the limitations that physics are likely to make on future advances.
I found this book to be quite fascinating. The author succeeds in giving a profound understanding of the technologies in use by the military. However, he is quite clear in his belief that the weapon systems are approaching the limits imposed upon them by physics. As such, future changes are likely to be evolutionary, rather than the revolutionary changes hoped for by proponents of RMA.
I don't know that I entirely agree with Professor O'Hanlon's conclusions, but I must say that he makes a very persuasive case. But, besides its conclusions, the books information on military technology is quite fascinating in any case. Therefore, if you are interested in military affairs, I highly recommend that you read this book.
Rating: 5
Summary: Puts RMA In Its Place, Smartly--Essential Reading
Comment: Graciously, and with wicked clarity, the author knocks the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs flat on its back, and then helps it to one knee. His introductory review of the RMA schools of thought (system of systems, dominant battlespace knowledge, global reach, and vulnerability or anti-access or asymmetric), with appropriate notes, is helpful to any adult student. The heart of his book can be distilled down to one chart showing the expected rates of advance in the various technical domains relevant to military operations. Of 29 distinct technical groups across sensors, computers and communications; projectiles, propulsion, and platforms; and other weapons, he finds only two technology areas-computer hardware and computer software-capable of revolutionary change in the foreseeable future. Eight others-chemical sensors, biological sensors, radio communications, laser communications, radio-frequency weapons, nonlethal weapons, and biological weapons-are judged capable of high but not revolutionary advances. All other technical areas, namely those associated with mobility platforms and weaponry itself, are unlikely to develop at anything above a moderate pace. In the course of his discussion of each of these he brings forth the basics of physics and real-world constraints and points out that even the best of our sensors are frustrated by heavy rain and other man-made countermeasures. He correctly evaluates the inability of our existing and planned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to keep up with targeting needs, particularly in urban and heavy canopy terrain. He also notes in passing that human intelligence may well prove to be the sustaining element in finding individual people, and that there has been no significant change since World War II in the numbers of troops needed per 1,000 inhabitants-infantry is still the core force. He systematically dismisses a variety of RMA claims, among the most dangerous being that we can afford to stand down many of our forward bases, by pointing out that combat aircraft continue to have short ranges, ground forces continue to require heavy logistics sustainment, ships remain slow to cross oceans, and it continues to be extremely difficult to seize ports and other fixed infrastructure. He concludes the book with a number of budgeting recommendations, both for the USA and for its allies. For the USA he would emphasize communications and computing, the one area truly open to an RMA in the near term. Other areas meriting immediate investments include strategic sea and air lift, the rapid development of a lighter tank and a mine-resistant infantry vehicle, and improvements in naval mine warfare. He supports the National Missile Defense and would sustain more robust RDT&E experimentation. For a major US ally, with a fraction of our funding, he recommends a $15 billion total investment over several years to acquire a thoughtful mix of advanced C4I enhancements including ground stations, a fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 1000 cruise missiles, 5000 short-range munitions, 500 advanced air to air missiles, a squadron of stealth aircraft, and several batteries of theater missile defense radars and missiles. A very nice listing of major Pentagon acquisition programs supports his recommendation that we economize on major weapons platforms and pursue a high-low mixed strategy, limiting, for example, our procurement of the F-22 and joint strike fighters so as to afford more F-15s and F-16s. Overall this book fulfills its mission of reviewing technologies in relation to the future of warfare, and it provides the reader with a very strong stepping stone for venturing into the literature of defense transformation. Those who would criticize this work for failing to consider the competition or the metrics of evaluation have a point, but only a point-the book does what it set out to do. It evaluates specific technologies in relation to the inflated and often delusional claims of the proponents of the RMA. One book cannot solve all our problems, but it can, as this book does, blow away some of the foggy thinking emanating from the Pentagon and other places where a number of flag officers and their staffs have lost sight of ground truth.
Rating: 1
Summary: like most budget-based analyses -- topical
Comment: Michael O'Hanlon's book does more than just fail to add to the literature of RMA [revolution in military affairs] thinking. It obscures.
What should be central to any understanding of the future of warfare and the role that technology and technological change plays in that future is the concept of *competition* -- something O'Hanlon gives almost no attention to.
This is perhaps not surprising in that O'Hanlon is what is called a policy wonk. Budget-based analyses are his bread and butter. Which would be fine if you are dealing with, say, the future of social security.
But when dealing with warfare, understanding technological change means: first, understanding the technology; and second, understanding the competition.
The first is not as easy as it sounds. Understanding technology means understanding measures of effectiveness. Measuring a machine gun by the standards of, for example, an artillery piece, will mean that the machine gun clearly falls short in every category [range, munitions requirements, etc.]. But the US did exactly that during the late 19th and early 20th centuries when considering whether to adopt the machine gun. Seems ridiculous now, of course, but such is the benefit of hindsight. These days, are we measuring the effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicles by comparing them to aircraft? If we are, is a modern aircraft an appropriate measure of effectiveness?
Second, you have to understand the competition. When a country, such as China or Iran, is developing long-range cruise missile and ballistic missile technology, and can link that technology through commercially available GPS satellites and real-time high resolution satellite imagery, then just how would US forces try to project power in the region if the range of these weapons are of sufficient reach to effectively deny U.S. access to bases near the theater of operations? What types of technology can provide answers to this kind of challenge?
None of these questions are dealt with in O'Hanlon's all-too-topical survey of RMA thinking. You can be enthusiastic or skeptical of whether there is an RMA just around the corner, but budget-based analysis, with a scant overview [and no assessment] of the technology when coupled with a paucity of description concerning current or future competition, just clouds an already loosely-defined field.
Finally, and perhaps most damningly, O'Hanlon assumes that areas with the greatest amount of technological change will automatically produce the greatest amount of change in warfare -- a huge assumption for which he gives no historical justification whatsoever. Indeed, far too many military revolutions were technologically evolutionary in origin, with slow and incremental changes across a broad array of different technologies suddenly affording an RMA -- the German blitzkrieg involved technological change (some rapid, some incremental) involving technologies ranging from internal combustion engines, to radio communications, to parachutes, to changes in muzzle velocity and firespower.
Perhaps worst of all, O'Hanlon gives little attention to the fact that, as with blitzkrieg, most military revolutions are only partly technological -- a huge role in any RMA is played by changes in organizational structure and doctrine.
Yet far too many skeptics of the RMA debate -- O'Hanlon being a good example -- produce the straw-man argument that RMAs only involve technological solutions to military problems, and then such skeptics disingenuously 'knock the argument flat on it's back' by showing how such an argument inevitably has shortcomings. What simplistic tripe!
If skeptics like O'Hanlon would get their facts straight on what an RMA actually involves, they'd have a much harder time dismissing the possibility of a current RMA. But with such blatant omissions, I'm afraid that I can only come to the conclusion that the author is not really analyzing the issue, but grinding an axe.
I give the book one star. It gets one for mentioning RMA schools of thought [which few other books do]. I would give it one for including rates of technological change in different areas [sensors, information, biotechnology, et. al.], but such a metric should actually be taken with a huge grain of salt.
In the end, I found the book to be of little use, adding nothing to the debate...
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