Order from a Major Online Bookstore
Ultimate Book Price Comparison Engine
Save Your Time And Money
| AnyBook4Less.com | Order from a Major Online Bookstore |
|
| Home | Store List | FAQ | Contact Us | | ||
| Ultimate Book Price Comparison Engine Save Your Time And Money |
||
 |
Title: Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror 1801-1805 by Joseph Wheelan ISBN: 0-7867-1232-5 Publisher: Carroll & Graf Pub. Date: September, 2003 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $27.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 3.2 (5 reviews)
Rating: 3
Summary: Deserves a read
Comment: The major reason to read this book is that there simply aren't enough books that try to give a reasonably comprehensive history of the the Tripolitan War and US policy at the time. A lot of books focusing on the war are more concerned with the naval history, and "the birth of the US Navy." That is all well and good, but the politics, policy, and financial aspects of the war deserve a lot of attention in a single volume as well as the remarkable achievements of the young Navy in the Mediterranean. Important lessons can be drawn from our experience and applied today.
However, the subtitle: "America's First War on Terror" is hyperbolic. This is understandable, though, since it will augment the book's sale, and there is nothing wrong with a book out there on this topic that is accessible to us laymen. Also, the heavy use of "The Terror" in the early chapters in referring to the piracy gets a little worn. On the other hand, Roger Albin's vituperative response to the book is totally over the top, since author Wheelan barely discusses September 11 in the preface, and nowhere in the text (see the index). It is left to the reader to draw direct (or indirect) parallels. The Barbary states weren't terrorists as we understand them today. Tactics of terror were used by these mercenary states, as were "liberal" justifications of their piracy through Koranic verse, but we should be careful about blurring those vile and venal potentates with the far more sophisticated and apocalyptic terrorists of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda's global political vision is far scarier, far more dangerous, and warrants a far more unrelenting and thorough destruction than the Barbary states did.
However, important lessons can be gained from studying this early naval war: (1) It was an expeditionary war that depended on mobility, improvisation, and unorthodox tactics; (2) Some enemies cannot be engaged with dialogue, or speech as we know it, but only through force and violence; (3) American domestic politics (Congress particularly) heavily favors half-measures and mediocre solutions while allowing domestic partisan fights to obscure our understanding of the enemy; and, (4) A confused domestic response undermined the country's diplomatic capital, allowing opponents to infer weakness and exploit us, compromising the military response.
Also, the inexplicable silliness of the Navy's first cruise in the Med should also be a major lesson about keeping objectives clear and firmly in mind.
Currently, those weaknesses are highly instructive, and not as some sort of validation of current policies. Addressing them reduces the country's vulnerability, and allows us to exercise power abroad more coherently and more successfully. We can also draw lessons from the great strength's of this war via this book, which were the personalities of its heroes. William Eaton, with his brazeness, creativity, and unrelenting spirit, is a great example of the American creatively making the best out of a confusing situation with the limited resources he's been allowed. For all of his often sad flaws, he should be studied by everyone.
I think JEFFERSON'S WAR merits three-and-a-half stars, mainly from the uninspiring writing, and a tendency towards a style that favors really breathless and overwritten narrative. What I really like about this book, though, is he gives a succinct, yet accurate history of the Barbary states' relations to Europe up to Tripoli's war with America, which I think is really important. Europe was tolerating the piracy in the Mediterannean for hundreds of years, so claiming that the Napoleonic Wars explains the lack of European puissance is inadequate to say the least.
Also, you will see from reading excerpts of Adams', Jefferson's, and Eaton's, letters 'et al' that the pride and dignity of a young nation being extorted by pirates was just as important to them as was its economic health; both of which were explicitly being fought for with Jefferson's policies and the US Navy's actions, and both of which are thoroughly explored in Wheelan's text, any reviewers' arguments about Wheelan's "implications" to the contrary.
A more rigorous, and I think an equally readable book, is Michael Kitzen's TRIPOLI AND THE UNITED STATES AT WAR, which is sadly out of print. It's primarily based on U.S. documents, and does a great job with William Eaton's letters.
Rating: 4
Summary: America wins its first war against a terrorist foe
Comment: Joseph Wheelan has provided us with a timely book in Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801-1805. In this age where the United States is fighting terrorists in the middle east, Wheelan has given us a historical background of the American struggles against the Barbary states.
The Barbary States (Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers) were engaged in what Wheelan describes as terrorism - capturing American ships and enslaving their passengers simply because they were Christians and not Moslems. The wars appear to be an extension of the age-old religious wars that have been ongoing for thousands of years. However, President Jefferson decided that he would end the battle between America and the Barbary States by fighting a military conflict with the aggressors.
Wheelan does a fantastic job of describing the individual military endeavors during the war, and he provides us with top-notch descriptions of the acts undertaken by the enslaving Barbarians against the Christian prisoners.
I enjoyed the book tremendously, and would recommend it to all as reading on a subject that is not well known in our nation's history. However, the last few chapters of the book really start to slide outside of the expectations based on the title - Wheelan dives into the War of 1812 against the British and the ongoing fight against the Barbary states into the Madison administration. These small detractors notwithstanding, the book is an excellent addition to the literature on America's early naval history.
Rating: 1
Summary: Terrible Anachronisms and Omissions
Comment: This is a bad book. Its not that the quality of writing is poor, while Wheelan's style is cliched he is not an incompetent writer, or that the author is being deliberately misleading. The problem is that the author's desire to see the Barbary War as an analogue of our present situation has overpowered his critical judgement. The Barbary War was not a war on terror in the modern sense. Political terror, in the modern sense, is violent extralegal acts carried out for political ends. In Iraq right now, terrorist acts are being committed to undermine the authority and chance of success of the American occupation. The piracy of the Barbary states was primarily a commercial, not a political, enterprise. Similarly, the American intervention in the Mediterrenean was not primarly in defense of any "principle" but an effort to defend a major American industry. Merchant shipping was tremendously important to the early American economy. Far from being a new phenomenon in American history, the Barbary War was, like several of Jefferson's most successful policies, an extension of pre-existing Federalist policies. During the Adams administration, the American Navy had been involved in an undeclared war in the Caribbean with French commerce raiders, the so-called Quasi-War. As acknowledged by Wheelan, this was the first major episode in the history of the American Navy and as described by Elkins and McKitrick in their excellent book on the Federalist period, was essentially a war to keep down Marine insurance rates. The Barbary intervention was a logical extension of Federalist policies about commercial protection. If the Barbary intervention has a modern analogue, it would be the first Gulf War, which was fought not over the ostensible issue of Kuwaiti sovereignty but really over control of world oil prices. I'm not trying to disparage either Jefferson's policies or those of the first Bush administration, these actions were completely justified, but not in the ways claimed by Wheelan.
There are a number of other problems with this book. Wheelan continually contrasts the supine performance of European powers with American devotion to 'principles.' His own narrative, however, shows that American governments frequently resorted to bribery and diplomacy when expedient. Wheelan devotes a number of pages and considerable purple prose to the real crimes of the Barbary states, notably slave-taking. The implication is that the Americans acted nobly in an effort to end this horrible practice which European states tolerated. America at this time, however, undoubtedly contained more slaves than the Barbary states. While importation of slaves into the USA was banned after 1800, American merchant shippers remained active in the African slave trade well after this date and neither the Jefferson administration nor later administrations made much effort to reduce American involvement in the African slave trade. Principle appeared to matter only when signficant commerical interest was involved. Wheelan implies also that European powers were unwilling to use force to suppress the piracy of Barbary states until after being shown how by the Americans. A useful question is what the relevant European powers were doing during this period and specifically, where were their navies? Though you would never know it from reading this book, almost all European nations were involved in the Napoleonic wars. The French, and at various times, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish navies were being blockaded in their home ports by the British Navy. The latter was the largest navy in the world and stretched to its maximum by demands of fighting the French. As Wheelan points out, in 1815 the British return to active suppression of Barbary piracy. This is not because of the example of American suppression but rather because 1815 is the definitive end of the Napoleonic conflicts and the British had the resources to expend on other activities.
Writing about history is supposed to be about understanding the past, not about justifying present policies.
 |
Title: Jefferson's Great Gamble: The Remarkable Story of Jefferson, Napoleon and the Men Behind the Louisiana Purchase by Charles A. Cerami ISBN: 1570719454 Publisher: Sourcebooks Trade Pub. Date: March, 2003 List Price(USD): $22.95 |
 |
Title: Washington's Crossing (Pivotal Moments in American History) by David Hackett Fischer ISBN: 0195170342 Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: February, 2004 List Price(USD): $35.00 |
 |
Title: "Negro President" : Jefferson and the Slave Power by Garry Wills ISBN: 0618343989 Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Co Pub. Date: 01 November, 2003 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
 |
Title: Thomas Jefferson by R. B. Bernstein ISBN: 0195169115 Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: August, 2003 List Price(USD): $26.00 |
 |
Title: Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea by Robert K. Massie ISBN: 0679456716 Publisher: Random House Pub. Date: 28 October, 2003 List Price(USD): $35.00 |
Thank you for visiting www.AnyBook4Less.com and enjoy your savings!
Copyright� 2001-2021 Send your comments
