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Title: Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Issues in Low Intensity Conflict) by Mark Adkin ISBN: 0-669-20717-9 Publisher: Simon & Schuster Pub. Date: 01 July, 1989 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $27.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.5 (4 reviews)
Rating: 5
Summary: An Excellent Objective Approach to the Grenada Invasion!
Comment: "We blew them away," a senior White House advisor remarked regarding the overwhelming success of the invasion of Grenada in late 1983. For the first time in history, a democratic nation had crushed a Marxist regime-and did so with few casualties. To the untrained eye, it seemed that the U.S. military had operated flawlessly in defeating the communists in Grenada. However, the British Major Mark Adkin, Commanding Officer of the Caribbean Peace-keeping Force (CPF), contests that theory and counters in his book Urgent Fury that the U.S. armed forces came extremely close to a major political defeat. Adkin asserts that American forces were never in jeopardy of losing the battle for Grenada. However, he believes that the U.S. military command had committed major flaws in the planning and carrying out of Operation Urgent Fury. These leaders narrowly escaped insurmountable American deaths through luck and through the battlefield intuition of lower grade officers.
Adkin's main assertion is that the invasion of Grenada was not the staunching success that the military and the Reagan Administration heralded. Adkin draws out several major accounts of compromised military objectives and traces all of these back to poor planning on a senior officer's part. From the initial invasion on October 25 to the "all-clear" in December, the military units involved were sent out on poorly planned and uncoordinated missions that nearly cost America numerous casualties. Fortunately the U.S. had on its side overwhelming superiority and availability of American fire support to bail out our forces from near defeat.
The invasion of Grenada was divided into two major sections. The first was the U.S. Marine landing in the northern division of the island. The second assault was in the southern portion of the island and was composed of elements from the Navy SEALS, U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, and the 82nd Airborne-the Army's elite paratroop division.
It is in the second assault which Adkin details most in the book. This is because of the fact that it was in the southern portion of the island most of the major complications happened. Adkin has a major bias against the special operations units in the southern assault because he is a member of the British elite and the British and American forces tend to have a friendly rivalry. Adkin's main contention against the American elite units is due to the fact that he was the commander of the third assaulting force on Grenada, the British led CPF. Adkin personally witnessed the planning and carrying out of the invasion of Grenada. Therefore, in Urgent Fury he illustrates just how close America came to shipping home hundreds of body bags.
There are three reoccurring themes in Urgent Fury which show the ineffective leadership of the planners and senior commanders. The first contention the author has is the lack of military intelligence involved in planning the island invasion. The military had not topographical maps of the island and was forced to use outdated British touring maps to plan the invasion. Also, the nature and location of the enemy forces were almost completely unknown to the invading forces. This lack of knowledge resulted in the shooting down of several choppers by Cuban anti-aircraft guns and caused Delta Force to abort two missions. The helicopters simply could not drop the units off in the middle of a firefight.
The second problem was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system. Unlike the fighting elements which were organized to conduct operations independent of one another, communications systems were not allowed such freedom. Adkin believes that communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of that mission. It cannot be said that communications capability itself was abundant. The author cites several dilemmas in the shortages of communications, but the most compelling is the account of the SEAL assault upon the Governor-General's mansion in which the units were pinned down against an overwhelming force heavy machine guns. Hovering above the men fighting were two large gunships which they were unable to contact through the radio. They were forced to use a telephone in the mansion to call their commander at Fort Bragg, N.C. to gain radio access to the gunships. Adkin points out that the fact that these units could not communicate one-to-one could have caused more casualties from enemy and friendly fire.
However, the most shocking and dangerous part of the mission was the fact that the invasion force lacked precise data on the location of the American medical students they were to rescue. Adkin notes that attack planners did not realize that more than a thousand American medical students were spread out over three locations instead of merely at the True Blue campus in the southern tip of the island. When the Rangers counted the students they realized that there were more than four hundred missing. Fortunately for our sake, Adkin asserts, the Marxist forces did not bother with these students. If the enemy had chosen to use the students as human shields, the battle would have been much bloodier on both the military and civilian sides.
The book raises no real objections to the author validity. Adkin fought in Grenada as a commander and gives first hand account. Furthermore, he also uses primary sources from actual after action reports to support his claims on the fallacies of the senior American command. This book has raised doubts on the quality of leadership involved in the Grenada invasion, but does so logically and with thoroughly grounded contextual evidence. The book challenges our perception as to whether we should believe that superior technology always guarantees battlefield success.
In Grenada, American forces had a five to one ratio in manpower and an overwhelming firepower advantage over the Marxists and yet there were multiple opportunities for disaster. We just were lucky. Adkin believes that we cannot trust luck to guide us in future conflicts. In war, the commanders need to be aware of the potential cost of their actions. He believes that there is no excuse for unsound decisions as they are placing men's lives at risk. There is no replacement for real military leadership.
Rating: 4
Summary: excellent account of this engagement
Comment: Adkins brings out the strenghts and weaknesses of our military at that time and shows how this, but for the bravery of the rangers , could have been a catastrophe. One glaring error, on p284 the casualties listed on the calivigny raid are improper.Slater and Lannon are correctly named however the third casualty was not Sebastian Greiner but Philip S. Grenier. I can assure you of this since I am his father. Sure wish I could correct the error or at least contact the Publisher or author. Mr. Jean A. Grenier
Rating: 5
Summary: THE BEST BOOK YET WRITTEN ON THE BATTLE FOR GRENADA
Comment: This is THE book to learn what happened on Grenada in 1983. This battle overlooked today marked the turning point in the Cold War. This was the first American military victory since the Vietnam War and sent a signal to the Soviets that communist expansion would cease under the Reagen administration. Major Adkin's book covers all of this, and points out the fight centered on the 10,000 foot strategic runway at Point Salines which as proven by the vast quantities of arms captured was the transfer point to all of Latin America for violence.
The book shows how the New Jewel Movement collapsed due to personal jealousies and assassinations leading to a swift U.S. plan to invade, which while not perfect, was necessary rather than delay in order to secure American medical students held hostage from harm. Reading the details he lays out of the U.S. Army Rangers parachuting in under 500 feet--under Cuban anti-aircraft guns---to seize the Point Salines airfield is exilherating and well wriitten, and busts open the Hollywood myths foisted by movies like "Heartbreak Ridge" that marines did the fighting and rescuing when their assignments to the north were uncontested, and without any Americans to be rescued. Adkin shows how the PRA and Cubans were dug in on the beaches waiting for a water landing when The Rangers, then the 82d Airborne Division came from the sky, catching them by surprise. Follow on operations had the Rangers rescuing U.S. medical students using mc and U.S. Army helicopters and the 82d Airborne Division fighting against stiff resistance before fanning out to secure the southern half of the island.
The book doesn't flinch however from tactical details and how things could have been done better. He has maps and drawings of where the actions took place that drive his points home, as well as photographs, to include mc helicopters that were shot down, and the leaders and rivals in the New Jewel movement. Readers will enjoy small points like the Ranger officer who used a signal mirrror t! o mark a Cuban recoilless rifle gun in a building for destruction by a TOW missile.
The point derived from this awesome book is that U.S. forces must be ready to conduct no-notice operations and to be able to come from unexpected directions like parachuting from the AIR as well as conventional sea directions. This book is a must-read for anyone in the military today or who has any interest in modern tactical affairs.
AIRBORNE!!
Mike Sparks 1st Tactical Studies Group (A)
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Title: Grenada 1983 (Men at Arms, 159) by Lee Russell, Albert M. Medez ISBN: 0850455839 Publisher: Motorbooks Intl Pub. Date: 01 August, 1985 List Price(USD): $14.95 |
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