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Title: The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 by Geoffrey Wawro ISBN: 0-521-58436-1 Publisher: Cambridge University Press Pub. Date: 25 August, 2003 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $35.00 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.67 (6 reviews)
Rating: 4
Summary: Franco Prussian War
Comment: In the Franco-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro once again demonstrates a solid command of his subject, from researching minute details to crafting impressive theories with logical conclusions. This book is a follow up to his Austro-Prussian War and often uses that war as a backdrop for events a half a decade later.
The book is an indictment of French generalship that in many ways should have either won the war or at least battled Moltke?s forces to a bloody stalemate. Prussia was not the military machine of perfect tactical execution myth would have us believe. In fact both France and Prussia committed blunders during battles, but Prussia owed much of its early success to the accuracy of its artillery. Bismarck and Moltke were willing to throw thousands of men to their deaths at the hand of the dreaded French Chassepot rifle, while French generals Bazaine and Bourbaki squandered every advantage through inactivity.
In a course of five weeks, German forces had routed every French army leaving Paris open for conquest. But here is where France?s indecisiveness actually aided it. With Napoleon III out of the way, there was no legitimate French government to negotiate a peace. Prussia dispatched forces to the Loire Valley in attempts to defeat any French force in the field, which confounded Bismarck and strained the Prussian economy.
In the end Bismarck forced France to accept a humiliating peace that festered in French politicians hearts and minds for four decades. Though this war represents the end of Bismarck?s use of conflict to realize his realpolitik, the impression on France had been made. One cannot really understand the First World War without first understanding the Franco-Prussian War.
Wawro?s knowledge is incredibly detailed and his writing style is very readable, though casual ?history buffs? will probably not grasp the full comprehensiveness of this magnificent work.
If the book has a fault, perhaps it is the lack of coverage of the Paris Commune and the revolution of post-Second Empire France. He gives this topic brief coverage, but the detail of which he described the road to war and the conflict itself is surprisingly missing.
Rating: 5
Summary: The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1
Comment: Wawro (Naval War College) has written an extraordinary history of the Franco-Prussian War, one of the most significant wars in modern European history. This conflict changed European history, aided Otto von Bismarck in creating an imperial Germany, and, in so doing, help to cause the bloody slaughter of 1914-18. In brilliant writing, the author describes the terrible battles in which the French troops, with one of the best rifles available, were slaughtered by the superior Prussian artillery. Wawro uses a wide variety of documentary sources to create a dazzling, often moving account of the conflict that brought down the Emperor Louis Napoleon and changed the map of central Europe. The bloody battles that caused heavy casualties in both armies are portrayed in striking detail. The author shows the marked contrast between the two armies: the Prussians, fit, younger, and better educated; the French, older, prone to drink too much, and poorly disciplined. There is a striking portrait of Marshall Achille Bazaine, France's premier general, who was too lackadaisical and whose slothfulness contributed mightily to France's defeat. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. All modern European history collections.
Rating: 4
Summary: Don't Throw Howard's Book Out Just Yet
Comment: For the past four decades, the most comprehensive English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 has been Professor Michael Howard's book, first published in 1961. Geoffrey Wawro, the U.S. Naval War college professor who in 1996 wrote an interesting revisionist history of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, has now written a book to compete with Howard's classic. In a nutshell, Wawro's book is quite good, but it complements rather than replaces Howard's book.
Wawro's assessment of the opposing military systems is rather biased in favor of the conscription-based German armies over the smaller French regular army. Wawro focuses on one problematic French regiment and uses it to categorize the entire French army as riddled with poor morale, incompetent leadership and lax discipline. Indeed, Wawro equates alcohol consumption in the French army with unsoldierly behavior - what about the famous alcoholic general named Grant who took Vicksburg seven years before? While Wawro frequently notes drunken German troops later in the campaign, somehow this did not represent German indiscipline. Wawro also makes a big point about the superiority of German pre-war planning, but this is questionable on two accounts. First, the French were hardly alone in lacking detailed contingency war plans in 1870 - few other nations had them either. Second, Wawro admits the German operational plan - to encircle both French armies on the frontier - failed (MacMahon's army escaped to Chalons and while Bazaine's army was encircled, it was due to French lethargy, not the German plan).
Wawro's two main theses about the war are continuations of earlier themes from his book on the Austro-Prussian War. His first thesis - that incompetent French leadership was at the root of the defeat - equates General Bazaine's fumbling behavior at Metz with Austrian General Benedek's mistakes at Königgrätz. However, there are problems with this thesis. Bazaine had demonstrated real battlefield competence in previous wars, while Benedek was more of a paper-pusher. Bazaine's conduct indicates that political calculations - rather than incompetence - were at the root of the general's failure to act. Furthermore, Bazaine was a mere corps commander in 1870, not commander-in-chief like Benedek, meaning that the Austrian commander was in a much better position to ensure readiness for war and sound operational planning than Bazaine.
The author's second thesis is that French defeat was attributable to tactical defects, namely that French superiority in the chassepot rifle was trumped by superior German artillery; these technical disparities made the French troops more defensive-minded while the Germans were more aggressive. It is unfortunate that Wawro does not delve deeper into the opposing infantry and artillery tactics. Both the German and French infantry used large numbers of skirmishers, but the Germans were more inclined to conduct reckless frontal attacks. Neither army had a doctrine for tactical withdrawals, which meant that retreats quickly turned into routs. As for the artillery, the German Krupp breech-loaders were certainly more advanced than the French artillery, but the range advantage was smaller than Wawro suggests only (150 - 750 meters further), giving the German artillerymen a 5-27% advantage in range and 0-60% advantage in rate of fire. German fuses were also better and the Germans pushed their artillery further forward, but none of this added up to a decisive advantage. Wawro fails to note that post-war analysis revealed that only 8% of all casualties were caused by artillery fire, which seriously undermines his tactical thesis.
French defeat was primarily due to the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III. While the emperor did push the chassepot and mitrailleuse, he allowed the legislature to veto funds for artillery modernization and he squandered millions on adventures like Mexico and his own personal embezzlements of public funds. Napoleon III also over-spent on his navy to match English strength, but this fleet was virtually useless against threats from Prussia; a smaller French navy would have provided the manpower for another French corps as well as funds for artillery modernization. The French logistic collapse - never mentioned by Wawro - was caused by lack of preparations for a mobile campaign, such as buying more horses. Once the French army moved away from its supply depots it quickly became an unfed and short of ammunition - is it any wonder that morale deteriorated? German logistics were equally close to collapse once they pushed deep into France, and this over-reliance on distant rail heads would come back to haunt Germany in future wars.
Throughout the narrative, I was suspicious that Wawro was concealing facts that indicated French success or German failure. According to Wawro, the French naval blockade of Germany's coast accomplished nothing - he doesn't mention that they captured 80 German merchantmen in the first month of the war. Wawro is reticent about German losses, such as failing to mention the 10,000 German casualties at Froeschwiller. Later, Wawro omits critical details about the French counterattack to relieve Belfort in January 1871; he asserts that the French "sat idly on the road ..[to] Belfort from 10-13 January." In fact, Howard's account details the French victory at Villersexel on 9 January that led to a 5-mile advance toward Belfort in this period; why does Wawro ignore one of the few French tactical victories?
The Franco-Prussian War can be viewed simplistically as a triumph of German aggressiveness and technical skill over French sloth - as Wawro does - or it could be viewed as an opportunistic event where one nation was better placed to exploit temporary advantages. The French army of 1870 was far better than the outcome of the war indicated and indeed, this was probably the best French army the Germans ever fought. In term of casualty ratios, the Germans inflicted 3.8 casualties for everyone of their own in the 1914 invasion of France, 2.5 to 1 in the 1940 campaign but only 0.7 to 1 in the 1870 invasion. Had the French army in 1866 obtained the 13 million francs it needed for artillery modernization, is there any doubt that the results of the Franco-Prussian war would have been much different - Bazaine or no Bazaine?
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Title: The Austro-Prussian War : Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 by Geoffrey Wawro ISBN: 0521629519 Publisher: Cambridge University Press Pub. Date: 13 September, 1997 List Price(USD): $24.00 |
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