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Title: Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East by Michael Oren, Michael B. Oren ISBN: 0-345-46192-4 Publisher: Presidio Press Pub. Date: 03 June, 2003 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 4.61 (96 reviews)
Rating: 5
Summary: The Unneccessary War
Comment: Recent historiography on the Arab-Israeli Conflict has focused almost exclusively on the 1948 War. The 1967 War, which rivals the War of Independence in terms of importance in shaping the region, has been overlooked. Michael Oren has written the first comprehensive account of this monumental event, based on the archives on the principal actors involved. Oren devotes about half on the book to the origins of the war, since they were both complex and highly unusual: Most wars are disputes between states over territory, influence, power, allies, etc. The Six Day was about power and influence, but not between the combatants. Rather, it was a result of Nasser's desire to increase his power in both his own country and the Arab world. As such, it was a war that didn't need to happen, and one with disastrous result for the region.
Following a false Soviet report that Israel was moving against Syria, Nasser started increasing anti-Israel rhetoric and action. His goal at first was merely to improve his own position at home and abroad by being seen as taking on the Zionist invader. But he unwittingly unleashed a chain of events that eventually swept him up by their momementum. As pro-war crowds rallied in Cairo, Nasser moved his troops into the Sinai, and then demanded that the UN observers stationed there leave, which they did. This, coupled with the closing of the Straits of Tiran, which Israel considered a Causus Belli, probably made the war inevitable. Nasser then began to believe his own rhetoric, and drew plans for an invasion.
Meanwhile, the situation elsewhere grew worse for Israel. The Arab world rallied behind Nasser, and the other states, including Jordan agreed to back Egypt. The driving force behind all this was visceral Arab hatred of Israel; Oren makes this intense dislike of the Jewish state palpable, and can feel the strength of this emotion's permeation througout the Arab world. Israel tried to gain French and Western support, but was unable to do so. In Tel-Aviv, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his cabinet weighed their options, and agonized over what to do. When they finally decided to go to war, it was almost too late: Nasser had cancelled an order to attack the day before.
The war began on June 5th with an aerial assault on Egyptian targets that achieved all of its objectives. Israel then launched a ground offensive, which immediately drove back the Egyptians. The confused and poorly led Egyptian army never put up a real fight. In five days they were driven across the Suez Canal with huge losses. On the second day, Jordan began to shell Israeli positions in Jerusalem. Israel began with a limited response, but the fighting increased, and Israel decided to take the Old City as a military necessity. It was also militarily necessary to take the West Bank to secure Jerusalem from Jordanian columns, but Eshkol immediately realized the problems that would come with occupying a hostile population. Syria did little more than shell Israel from behind their lines on the Golan Heights during the first days of the war. But Israel had put up with constant Syrian shelling before the war, and Rabin pushed for an attack to secure Israeli farms in the North. Syrian troops didnt even engage, and Israel took the Golan.
Oren' narrative is beliveable because he cites internal souces from the various sides (except Syria). This account will not be accepted by pro-Arab sources, or even revisionist historians, since Oren does not explain the Arab grievances against Israel, and does not conclude that Israel did not have to start the war, or that Israel wanted Jerusalem and the West Bank for expansionist, ideological reasons. But he supports his assertions, and until someone else writes a history based on primary sources, this will be the definitive account of the June 1967 Watershed.
Rating: 4
Summary: A Sweeping History
Comment: * Michael Oren's SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 & THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
MIDDLE EAST is, as the author explains in his introduction, an attempt to put
together a comprehensive and reasonably impartial history of the June 1967
Middle East War, or "Six-Day War".
Mr. Oren details the background of the story, in which Jewish settlement of
Palestine led to the creation of Israel and a bitter confrontation with the
Arabs living in the region, and then describes the tensions that led to the
1967 war, with Arab states competing to see who could be the loudest to
denounce the "Zionist entity" (they refused to call it "Israel"). Arab
leaders became believers in their own propaganda and refused to see the risks
inherent in their actions, taking satisfaction in Israel's increasing
fearfulness without taking seriously what they might do if their fear crossed
a certain lethal threshold.
Egypt almost pulled the trigger first, but Egyptian President Nasser
hesitated, and the Israelis beat the Arabs to the punch. US President Lyndon
Johnson and his administration felt that the Israelis would win a shooting
match, and this was quickly borne out when it became apparent that the Arab
forces were poorly trained, very badly led, and the Arab leaders were almost
as hostile to each other as they were to Israel. The result was an Israeli
triumph and an Arab disaster.
This is a story of war and personalities: the charismatic and shrewd Nasser,
who was taken in by his own rhetoric and lived to acknowledge his blunders;
Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, whose hysteria did much to lead to the disaster;
Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, whose wish to chart a safe and peaceful
course through troubles failed; Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, a
naturally low-key man who fractured but did not quite completely break under
the strain; Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, a real-life action hero with a
marvelous ability to say one thing and do another; and Jordanian King
Hussein, who was the most reluctant of the Arab leaders to go to war, was the
most earnest in fighting it once he did, and suffered the greatest losses.
In sum, Mr. Oren does seem to have achieved his goals in writing this book.
Its impartiality might be argued in places -- Mr. Oren is Israeli -- but he
has clearly made a conscientious effort to give both sides of the story, with
the source material for this book including many interviews on both sides of
the fence.
I would have to say that this book requires a certain amount of work and,
though it is of moderate length (if not brief), it is still somewhat more
than a person who isn't a hardcore student of MidEast politics could
reasonably absorb or retain in full. That isn't really a complaint, such
limitations being inescapable in writing a book that tries to be definitive,
and there are good reasons to want to write such a definitive book (which Mr.
Oren neatly outlines in the introduction).
That being said, I can highly recommend this book, not merely to students of
military matters but of history in general. We are still living with the
consequences of the Six-Day War, and it is somewhat fascinating to find out
that there were those at the time who had a perfectly good idea of what the
consequences might be.
Rating: 5
Summary: A Textbook Example of Top-Notch Historical Research
Comment: Michael B. Oren's "Six Days of War" is not only the definitive book on the 1967 Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is also a perfect primer in how to conduct historical research. Oren is meticulous and thorough in reviewing all of the available research to date -- books, newspapers, autobiographies, declassified government documents, oral interviews -- and synthesizing them into an accurate reference work. "Six Days of War" shows how to conduct fair and balanced research into an emotional issue. Nobody -- not anybody from the Israeli or Arab side -- could take issue with the book since Oren lets the facts and the main actors do the talking, and keeps his personal biases and beliefs to a minimum.
Oren does a great job in presenting the viewpoints of both the Arab and Israeli sides. Some of the anecdotes from the Arab side -- such as the comment "We shall meet in Tel Aviv" when the Arab armies were on the run, or the plea from Nasser's chief aid Amer that his plane not be shot at by Egyptian forces during the 1st day of the war -- are as illuminating of the chaos and lies during the "fog of war" as they are funny.
Some people claim that Oren is biased towards the Israeli side. This confuses two words -- bias and objectivity -- that are often used interchangeably, but have different meanings. If Oren were of Arab descent or if any Arab historian were to write an account of the 1967 conflict, it would have to follow the same path as Oren took. Bias deals with predisposition to favor one side or another; whether Oren does or doesn't is irrelevant. One can be biased towards one side or the other and still be objective. Of course, most instances concerning lack of objectivity concern individuals who allow their biases to color their judgment. Since Oren deals strictly with the facts of the 1967 conflict and the events leading up to it, there really isn't an opportunity for him to show "bias" by justifying the Israeli positions. Mind you, Oren does show Israel's position on the War -- just as he presents the Arab position with regard to the War and also the creation of the state of Israel (the real reason for the War and the 20 years of conflict up to that time). Anybody saying this book is "biased" either doesn't know the definition of the word biased, is confusing it with being objective (the two are not mutually exclusive), or hasn't read the book.
My only quibbles with this book are that like many history books, it goes into great detail on the events leading up to the conflict, and the early days of the conflict, but then it seems to "rush" a bit at the end. This is especially noteworthy in the chapter "Aftershocks" where I felt that a bit more detail on the events post-1967 could have been written. I also would have preferred additional commentary on the "where are they now?" discussions of the major Middle East players. Oren does spend some time talking about the major figures -- Sharon, King Hussein, Nasser, Arafat, Dayan -- but I would not have minded hearing his thoughts on the 1970's peace initiatives with Sadat and Egypt as well as Begin's tenure, the Oslo accords, etc. Of course, this has little to do with the 1967 conflict per se, but it would have been a nice "what has it led to?" ending to the story.
Of particular interest, the controversy regarding Security Council Resolution 242 is treated rather quickly. Given the focus today on land-for-peace the question of whether 242 refers to "territories" or "the territories" (the former implying Israel can hold on to some land, the latter demanding a return to the 1967 Green Line) is or paramount importance. Oren states that the official English translation refers to "territories" while the French and Arabic versions translate as "the territories." This may seem like a minor issue, but given the importance today, it deserved a few extra paragraphs at least, especially on how 242 was interpreted in the respective countries immediately after it was passed. It is possible that the two sides have been reading their own (correct) interpretations into the resolution since mid-1967, which goes along way to explaining the difficulties in achieving a peace agreement even today.
The meticulousness of the research is shown by the nearly 100 pages (almost 20% of the book) that are devoted to the bibliography and footnotes. Note the large number of personal interviews with many key players and actors from that time; only current historical books (like Bob Woodward's) are noted for their voluminous 1st-contacts and interviews with individuals actually involved in events. Oren interviewed dozens of Israeli, Arab, Russian, and American sources to get specific information not available from the books and newspapers and government documents dealing with the 1967 War.
Take a look at the photo section. There are some very good photos of younger-looking names you might know and some you might not: Begin (deceased) and Sharon (the current prime minister) come to mind. The cartoons from the Israeli and Arab press are also very informative. Several of the Arab cartoons directed at Israel are very chilling in presenting the atmosphere that Israel was contending with at that time. They show why Israel could not afford to take chances and endanger their survival.
All in all, an outstanding research piece which not only dissects the events leading up to, during, and after the 1967 War, but also shows how one should conduct research on any topic of history, by hitting all the available research materials (printed, classified, oral testimony) and interpreting it in the context of the time in which the events occurred.
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